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NON-ENFORCEMENT TAKINGS 
TIMOTHY M. MULVANEY* 
Abstract: The non-enforcement of existing property laws is not logically sepa-
rable from the issue of unfair and unjust state deprivations of property rights at 
which the Constitution’s Takings Clause takes aim. This Article suggests, there-
fore, that takings law should police allocations resulting from non-enforcement 
decisions on the same “fairness and justice” grounds that it polices allocations 
resulting from decisions to enact and enforce new regulations. Rejecting the ex-
tant majority position that state decisions not to enforce existing property laws 
are categorically immune from takings liability is not to advocate that persons 
impacted by such decisions should be automatically or even regularly entitled to 
the Takings Clause’s constitutional remedy. Rather, it simply suggests that 
courts should resist the temptation to formulaically and categorically prohibit 
non-enforcement takings claims in favor of assessing those claims on the merits. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause provides that “private property 
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”1 Though this 
provision originally applied only to physical appropriations resulting from 
governmental conduct,2 courts more recently have interpreted it to constrain 
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 1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 2 See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 792 (1995). The Supreme Court has acknowledged as 
much. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (“Prior to Justice Holmes’s 
exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, . . . it was generally thought that the Takings 
Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property, . . . or the functional equivalent of a 
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certain regulatory decisions, too.3 “Regulatory takings” claims, as they have 
come to be known, ordinarily are based on the government’s enactment and 
anticipated enforcement of a new regulatory safeguard or obligation affecting 
the use of the claimant’s property. Indeed, no federal or state court has found 
a taking based on the non-enforcement of an existing regulation against a 
third party, and most courts to have addressed such claims have rejected them 
summarily. Calling into question this majority view, this Article suggests that 
although takings claims grounded in non-enforcement, like traditional regula-
tory takings claims, rarely should succeed, they should be assessed on the 
merits to assure that the impositions resulting therefrom are fair and just ab-
sent compensation. 
The argument proceeds in three major parts. Part I first outlines what 
might be termed a democratic understanding of regulatory takings law.4 On 
this view, property is regarded as a socially crafted institution necessarily ac-
countable to the values that characterize our democracy. It follows that the 
substance of property laws must be collectively adjusted as social, economic, 
and moral perspectives on the content of these values—and conceptions of 
what might harm these values—change over time. An expectation that the 
Takings Clause should significantly obstruct these adjustments seems incon-
sistent with the understanding that property exists in service of democratic 
values. Regulatory takings law, if in fits and starts, has recognized as much. 
At the same time, though, takings jurisprudence also reflects courts’ apprecia-
tion for the idea that property owners and non-owners alike reasonably expect 
that these adjustments to property laws and the allocative impositions that 
result from them will be made in accord with the democratic principles of 
fairness and justice. The meaning of these principles is determined—and 
evolves—through contextualized application of the considerations that the 
U.S. Supreme Court famously set out in its 1978 decision in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City,5 as these considerations have been illu-
minated by precedent. 
The Part describes how courts to date ordinarily have entertained only 
those regulatory takings claims based on the government’s enactment and 
anticipated enforcement of a new regulatory safeguard or obligation affecting 
the use of the claimant’s property, and not those based on the non-enforce-
                                                                                                                           
‘practical ouster of [the owner’s] possession’” (citing Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 
(1879)). 
 3 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131–38 (1978); Pa. Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922). 
 4 See infra notes 11–78 and accompanying text. 
 5 438 U.S. at 124–28. 
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ment of an existing regulation affecting the property of another.6 This majori-
ty view that categorically opposes consideration of takings claims grounded 
in the non-enforcement of law operates on the premise that non-enforcement 
is not an exercise of state power that should be conceived of as capable of 
depriving individuals of private property. 
Part II contends that much as the state makes an allocative decision 
when it enacts and enforces new regulatory safeguards and obligations, it also 
makes an allocative decision when it decides not to enforce those already ex-
isting safeguards and obligations.7 In a constitutional democracy, the state 
must define and enforce private property rights. In doing so, it necessarily 
must make choices amongst competing claims to rivalrous resources. Thus, 
the state should be understood as exercising its power in the property sphere 
whether it enacts and enforces an existing law or refrains from doing so, for 
resolving any property dispute unavoidably involves its making an allocative 
choice to assign an interest to one party and not to another. Each instance of 
allocation, therefore, theoretically invokes the principles of fairness and jus-
tice that underlie takings law. 
This assertion is not intended to suggest that broad swaths of non-
enforcement decisions instantly should be deemed constitutionally problemat-
ic; indeed, the state’s omnipresence in allocating property rights is reason 
enough why takings liability should be reserved for only especially extreme 
cases. The claim here is far more modest: there are very exceptional instances 
where the state’s non-enforcement of existing regulatory safeguards and obli-
gations rises to the level of fundamental unfairness and injustice absent com-
pensation. Courts should leave space for open conversation and debate on the 
merits of individual cases to determine whether adjustments to property allo-
cations that occur via non-enforcement are fair and just without the provision 
of compensation, just as they have done in cases involving adjustments to 
property allocations that occur via the state’s enactment and anticipated en-
forcement of new regulations.8 
Through a series of examples, Part III considers the application of regu-
latory takings law, as defined in Part I, to the types of allocative decisions—
those grounded in the non-enforcement of existing property laws—discussed 
in Part II.9 These examples include typical disputes involving the non-
                                                                                                                           
 6 See infra notes 11–78 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 79–165 and accompanying text. 
 8 This Article generally leaves aside as fodder for future work the prospect of applying tak-
ings law to non-enactment situations, i.e., situations in which a deprivation occurs as a result of 
the state’s choosing not to enact a particular regulatory safeguard or obligation. For a brief discus-
sion of the topic, see infra notes 146-153 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 166–273 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement of common law trespass, roadway maintenance laws, and ve-
hicular speed limits, in which takings liability seems quite unlikely, as well as 
disputes involving the non-enforcement of flood control plans, water pollu-
tion discharge permits, and rental housing codes, where the takings issue pos-
es more challenging questions than most courts have allowed to date. Collec-
tively, these “easier” and “harder” illustrations present a platform to explore 
how one might evaluate a non-enforcement decision’s alignment with the 
democratic norms of fairness and justice that drive regulatory takings law. 
The Article concludes that considering non-enforcement takings liability 
reveals the possibility that takings law may assume a role that does not so 
much limit democratic lawmaking on property—as regulatory takings law is 
so often conceived—but, instead, one that enhances it by helping to assure 
that non-enforcement decisions, like enactment and enforcement decisions, 
are fair and just absent compensation.10 
I. TAKINGS AND DEMOCRACY 
Property presents an inevitable tension. A number of property’s benefits 
stem from the ability of owners to make life decisions on the belief that the 
scope of their property holdings will remain relatively stable. At the same 
time, the citizenry surely must be able to collectively adjust the meaning of 
ownership as social, economic, and moral perspectives change over time. 
Regulatory takings law, among other doctrines, performs the difficult task of 
mediating this tension. 
The development of regulatory takings law largely has rebuffed the as-
sumption, at least implicitly adopted by a great number of commentators of 
varying ideological perspectives, that the Takings Clause should be interpret-
ed to assure economically efficient regulation.11 Instead, this body of law op-
                                                                                                                           
 10 See infra note 273 and accompanying text. 
 11 Among the wealth of literature that understands takings law through the lens of efficiency, 
see, for example, Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 571 (1984); Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just 
Compensation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 137–38 (1992); Michael A. Heller & James E. 
Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1022–25 
(1999); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 602–
06 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986); 
Richard Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 553, 563–65 (1998). See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995) (using different theories of economic analysis to formu-
late a regulatory takings doctrine). Adherents to efficiency-based takings theories must confront, 
among other challenges, the absence of verifiable empirical evidence determining whether it is 
more efficient to force the government to internalize the external costs of regulation (and thereby 
allow property owners to ignore the external costs of their investments), or to do just the opposite 
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erates on the presupposition that the Constitution does not announce any min-
imum standards for property.12 Property laws—whether wealth-maximizing 
or not—are adopted through democratic means for the avowed purposes of 
furthering the public interest and promoting the values that characterize our 
system of self-governance.13 
On this presupposition, takings law should not be—and generally has 
not been—interpreted to restrict the democratic process of definition and ad-
justment of property allocations. As Section A sets out, however, takings law 
provides some assurance that property adjustments will be fairly and justly 
administered so as not to produce targeted or specialized impositions that dis-
respect the same interests and values that the institution of property is intend-
ed to serve.14 Section B explains that regulatory takings law’s “fairness and 
justice” analysis generally has been confined to situations in which the gov-
ernment has enacted and sought to enforce new regulatory safeguards or obli-
gations on the claimant landowner, and deemed inapplicable to instances in 
which the government fails to enforce existing regulations against third par-
ties.15 
A. A Democratic Approach to Regulatory Takings Law 
The foundations of a democratic approach to takings law can be traced, 
like so many insights in property and takings law, to the early writings of Pro-
fessor Joseph Sax.16 Ironically, the great legal realist, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, served as Professor Sax’s foil. Early in the twentieth century, Justice 
Holmes grounded takings analysis in an economic comparison of the dispari-
ty between the pre-regulation economic burden distribution and the post-
regulation economic burden distribution through the claimant’s eyes to in-
quire whether she reaps an “average” reciprocity of economic advantage from 
                                                                                                                           
(force property owners to internalize the external costs of their investments and make it more 
likely that the government will ignore the external costs of regulation). 
 12 See, e.g., ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COM-
MON GOOD 263 (2003). 
 13 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, 
Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 330 (2006); Timothy M. Mul-
vaney & Joseph William Singer, Move Along to Where? Property in Service of Democracy: A 
Tribute to André van der Walt (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 17-40, 2017), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2976009.  
 14 See infra notes 16–52 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 53–78 and accompanying text.  
 16 See generally Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [here-
inafter Sax, Police Power]; Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE 
L.J. 149 (1971). 
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the challenged regulation.17 Professor Sax countered in 1964 by describing 
takings compensation as an appropriate “bulwark against unfairness, rather 
than [as Holmes had insinuated] against mere value diminution” resulting 
from the “burdens” of regulation.18 Professor Sax decried rigid definitions of 
property as fixed in reference to existing economic values in favor of defining 
property as “the value which each owner has left after the inconsistencies be-
tween . . . competing owners have been resolved.”19 To Professor Sax, courts 
adjudicating takings claims must ask: “[A]gainst what qualitative kinds of 
value-diminishing acts should existing values be insulated?”20  
Professor Sax’s theory quickly worked its way into takings doctrine. In 
1969, the Court pointed to Professor Sax’s work, alongside that of just one 
other scholar—Frank Michelman, himself a monumental figure in takings 
law—as offering a worthy “general discussion of the purposes” of the Tak-
ings Clause.21 Various justices would proceed to draw on and cite to Professor 
Sax’s perspective on takings law in several of the Court’s most important tak-
ings decisions in the twenty-five years that followed.22 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 539–40 (1914) (finding that a Penn-
sylvania statute prohibiting the extraction of coal along property boundaries did not amount to a 
compensable taking because all affected mine owners would be reciprocally benefitted). The re-
sult of Justice Holmes’ exposition, at least on this interpretation, is that no owner can, on net, bear 
a diminution—at least any sizable diminution—in one’s property value at the hands of govern-
ment regulation. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes wrote for the Court that a 
Pennsylvania statute requiring mine owners to keep coal in place to prevent surface subsidence did 
not secure the mine owners an “average reciprocity of advantage” but rather redistributed value 
from the mine owners to the surface owners. See 260 U.S. at 422. 
 18 See Sax, Police Power, supra note 16, at 57 (emphasis added).  
 19 Id. at 61; see also LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND 
POWER 150–51 (2003) (contending that a presumption exists in favor of protecting the claimed 
property right only where the values that the right reflects are distinct from the values reflected in 
the public interest opposing that right). 
 20 Sax, Police Power, supra note 16, at 61, 63–64 (asking “to what kind of competition ought 
existing values be exposed; and, from what kind of competition ought existing values be protect-
ed”) (emphasis added). Professor Sax attributes nearly as much to the Supreme Court’s holding in 
United States v. Causby. See id. at 68 (citing Causby’s explanation that “it is the character of the 
invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it . . . that determines the question of whether it 
is a taking” (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946))). 
 21 Nat’l Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 90 n.2 (1969). 
 22 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023, 1025; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 864 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 
n.20, 497 n.25 (1987); Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson 
City, 473 U.S. 172, 199 n.17 (1985); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 442 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 
621, 649–50 n.15 (1981); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133–34 n.30. Professor Michelman has been 
attributed with establishing the theoretical landscape for economic models of the takings issue and 
takings analyses grounded in John Rawls’ conception of fairness. See generally Gregory S. Alex-
ander, Michelman as Doctrinalist, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 371 (2006) (referring to Frank I. 
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Com-
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In its 1978 decision in Penn Central, the Court, relying heavily on the 
writings of Professors Sax and Michelman, identified a non-exclusive list of 
considerations that courts should take into account in attempting to determine 
in an individual case whether an imposition stemming from a new regulatory 
safeguard or obligation is fair and just absent compensation.23 To decide 
when “fairness and justice require that economic injuries caused by public 
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain concentrated 
on a few persons,” the Court in Penn Central and its progeny counseled low-
er court judges to “engag[e] in . . . ad hoc factual inquiries” that include con-
sidering (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with the claimant’s investment-
backed expectations; and (3) the “character of the governmental action.”24 
The goals of “fairness and justice” and the considerations that Penn 
Central suggested to advance these goals in takings cases are of limited con-
tent in the abstract.  However, the expansive body of Supreme Court and low-
er court takings cases has given meaning to both the Penn Central considera-
                                                                                                                           
pensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967)). Professor Sax’s perspective on takings is decid-
edly focused on fairness, and the account I offer in this article better tracks that of Professor Sax 
than the principally utilitarian account set out by Professor Michelman. See Sax, Police Power, 
supra note 16, at 57. My account, however, bears some markings of Professor Michelman’s theo-
ry, too, including perhaps most significantly his emphasis on parties other than traditional takings 
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Michelman, supra, at 1214–16 (discussing “demoralization costs,” which he 
defines as the psychological impact on non-parties when a takings claimant is not afforded com-
pensation). 
 23 438 U.S. at 124, 128 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)); see 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8 (describing the considerations explicitly referenced in Penn Central 
as “keenly relevant”); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (“In Penn Central . . . the Court surveyed some of 
the general principles governing the Takings Clause.”) (emphasis added). Various lower court 
opinions discuss the non-exclusivity of the considerations explicitly identified in Penn Central as 
relevant to regulatory takings claims. See, e.g., Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
186, 213–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Herzberg v. County of Plumas, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 597–98 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005). The Shaw court described the three considerations documented in Penn 
Central as the “principle guidelines” but explained how the California courts have “identified 
from United States Supreme Court cases . . . a number of additional, nonexclusive factors that 
might be relevant considerations in a particular case of an alleged Penn Central regulatory tak-
ing.” Shaw, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 213–14, 214 n.38; see also Richard M. Frank, Inverse Condemna-
tion Litigation in the 1990s—the Uncertain Legacy of the Supreme Court’s Lucas and Yee Deci-
sions, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 85, 88 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme Court has not 
“comprehensively identified” the factors to be considered in a regulatory takings case and that the 
Penn Central decision is the closest it has come to identifying such factors). The Supreme Court’s 
June 2017 opinion in Murr v. Wisconsin includes language supportive of non-exclusivity. 137 S. 
Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (referring to “a complex of factors including” the types of considerations 
noted in Penn Central and asserting that the “central dynamic of the Court’s regulatory takings 
jurisprudence . . . is its flexibility”). 
 24 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
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tions and the goals that they were intended to serve.25 Although space con-
straints preclude an exhaustive account, a condensed summary of the leading 
interpretations of the Penn Central considerations’ pursuit of “fairness and 
justice” is sufficient to set out the most prominent aspects of the doctrine.  
As an initial matter, it is now evident that, outside the unique context 
of land use exactions,26 the “situation-specific” approach of Penn Central is 
applicable to almost all regulatory takings cases.27 Soon after Penn Central, 
the Court briefly attempted to identify situations in which new regulatory 
safeguards and obligations amount to takings per se. Most prominently, these 
situations involve regulations that result in permanent physical occupation of 
land by a stranger or deprive land of all economically viable uses, as set out, 
respectively, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation in 
1982 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council in 1992. However, this 
attempt has been exposed as a mere application of the Penn Central consider-
ations in cases in which one consideration so intensely weighs in favor of the 
claimant that the others may be either largely unnecessary or unworthy to 
contemplate in any depth. 28 Despite some rhetorical dicta to the contrary, 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601, 
631–54 (2015) (describing how Supreme Court and lower court takings cases give meaning to the 
considerations identified in Penn Central and the goals they serve). This is not to suggest that the 
courts always have been as explicit as they might be in explaining the extent to which the Penn 
Central considerations shed light on the fairness and justice of the governmental decision at issue 
in takings cases. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of 
Property and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 747–48 (2004) (arguing that although the Court 
consistently mentions “justice” and “fairness” as guiding principles behind the Takings Clause, it 
often does not sufficiently reference “justice” and “fairness” when discussing the primary issues 
of a takings case). 
 26 I have written at some length in the past on the distinctive takings analysis applicable in 
those instances where the state attaches exactions, or certain conditions, to development permits. 
See generally, Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511 (2012) 
[hereinafter Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future]; Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions 
and Progressive Property, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 137 (2016) [hereinafter Mulvaney, Legisla-
tive Exactions]; Timothy M. Mulvaney, On Bargaining for Development, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 66 
(2015); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 277 (2011); 
Timothy M. Mulvaney, The Remnants of Exaction Takings, 33 ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 189 (2010).  
 27 There are limited exceptions for what Professor Singer has described as “core property 
rights.” See Singer, supra note 25, at 644–47 (discussing Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997) 
(involving the right to pass property to others upon one’s death); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 
(1987) (discussing the right to pass property to others upon one’s death); Webb’s Fabulous Phar-
macies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (holding in a narrow circumstance that the interest 
earned on the interpleader fund while it was in the registry of the court was a taking violative of 
the Fifth Amendment); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (holding that the govern-
ment’s complete destruction of a materialman’s lien in certain property constituted a “taking”)). 
 28 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 (asserting that “[w]here ‘permanent physical occupation’ of 
land is concerned, we have refused to allow the government to decree it anew (without compensa-
tion), no matter how weighty the asserted ‘public interests’ involved”) (citation omitted); Loretto, 
458 U.S. at 441 (declaring that “permanent occupations of land by such installations as telegraph 
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these “categorical rules” are anything but categorical. Numerous examples 
indicate that the importance of the public interest in the regulation at issue 
matters in applying Loretto and Lucas. For instance, public accommodations 
laws establish a permanent public access easement that is justified without the 
provision of compensation,29 and depriving land of all of its economically 
viable uses is constitutionally unremarkable when the only viable uses of that 
land would produce significant public harm.30 
A decade after Lucas, the Supreme Court expressed in no uncertain 
terms its disinclination toward categorical rules in the takings context. In 
2001 in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court held that the fact that a claimant 
purchased property after the regulation about which she was now complain-
ing was adopted did not preclude her takings claim per se; instead, the Court 
explained that, on remand, the state court should use the Penn Central factors 
to determine whether a taking had occurred.31 Similarly, in Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in 2002, the 
Court rejected the claimant’s position that a development moratorium auto-
matically should be deemed a compensable deprivation of all economically 
viable uses regardless of any public interests served.32 Tahoe-Sierra noted 
that “[t]he Takings Clause requires careful examination and weighing of all 
the relevant circumstances” under the Penn Central “guideposts.”33 
                                                                                                                           
and telephone lines, rails, and underground pipes or wires are takings even if they occupy only 
relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner’s use 
of the rest of his land”); see also Okemo Mountain, Inc. v. Town of Ludlow, 762 A.2d 1219 (Vt. 
2000) (concluding that the State’s closure of a private road required takings compensation); Laura 
S. Underkuffler, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 161, 184–85 (1996) 
(suggesting that under an “operative” conception of property, “all property interests are not held 
with the same intensity and are not equally protected”). 
 29 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012) (prohibiting discrimination and segregation in places of public 
accommodation against individuals on the basis of their “race, color, religion, or national origin”). 
 30 Indeed, Lucas conceded as much. See 505 U.S. at 1029 (asserting that, in light of “back-
ground principles” of property law, the owner of a nuclear generating plant would “not be entitled 
to compensation” when it is “directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery 
that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault”). On the seemingly constrictive nature of Lucas’ 
discussion of “background principles,” see Timothy M. Mulvaney, Foreground Principles, 20 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 837, 844–50 (2013); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Instream Flows and the Public 
Trust, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 315, 369–71 (2009); Timothy M. Mulvaney & Brian Weeks, Water-
locked: Public Access to New Jersey’s Coastline, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 579, 596–98 (2007). 
 31 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001). On remand, a Rhode Island trial court 
judge rejected the landowner’s regulatory takings claim because it was unreasonable for one to 
expect to be able to fill and develop a saltwater pond and the adjacent marshlands. See Palazzolo 
v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *15 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005). 
 32 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 320–21 
(2002). 
 33 Id. at 327 n.23 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 
at 636). 
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In terms of the Penn Central considerations themselves, takings prece-
dent on the “character of the governmental action” has revealed that regulato-
ry takings claims generally succeed only when the state cannot justify an im-
position that is “functionally equivalent” to the imposition sustained in an 
ordinary exercise of the eminent domain power without providing compensa-
tion.34 It follows that claimants generally are not entitled to compensation for 
abiding by democratically-enacted and generally applicable regulatory safe-
guards and obligations that (1) advance generalized public interests;35 (2) 
prevent owners from causing harm to others’ person or property;36 (3) estab-
lish baseline standards for social and market interactions by, for instance, pro-
tecting consumers from deceptive practices;37 (4) mediate unavoidable con-
troversies;38 and (5) endorse constitutional norms, such as anti-discrimination 
and free speech.39 Regulations are more likely to require compensation when 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).  
 35 See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609–10 (1927) (holding that setback requirements 
do not constitute a taking); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395–97 (1926) 
(holding that a statutory building height limit did not result in a constitutional taking); Welch v. 
Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107–08 (1909) (holding that a statutory building height limit did not result 
in a constitutional taking and that the law fell within Massachusetts’ police power). 
 36 See, e.g., Keystone, 480 U.S. at 500–02 (upholding a Pennsylvania regulation that limited 
how much subsurface coal could be mined in order to protect surface structures); Goldblatt v. 
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595–96 (1962) (upholding a town regulation that prohibited 
excavation below the water table, which in turn rendered petitioner’s quarry effectively useless); 
Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 325 (1920) (upholding a statute conditioning the 
burning of natural gas); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 409–11 (1915) (upholding a regu-
lation that banned the operation of brick factories within Los Angeles’ city limits); Reinman v. 
City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176–77 (1915) (upholding a regulation banning livery stables 
from certain areas in the community); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 675 (1887) (upholding a 
regulation that banned the production of alcohol for recreational purposes); Powell v. Common-
wealth, 7 A. 913, 915–17 (Pa. 1887) (upholding a law that outlawed the production of oleomarga-
rine). 
 37 See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 445–48 (1934) (upholding 
the constitutionality of a state mortgage moratorium law, which allowed mortgagors to extend the 
time period in which owners could pay their mortgages); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156–58 
(1921) (holding that a rent control law, which regulated rent prices and allowed tenants to stay in 
their apartments so long as they paid on time and satisfied any other conditions of the lease, was 
not a taking). 
 38 See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 529–30 (1992) (upholding a law that sets 
mobile home rent prices and protects tenants’ possession of mobile home pads in contravention of 
the landlord’s claim to possession); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277–81 (1928) (upholding 
the constitutionality of a state law that forced the destruction of petitioner’s cedar trees that, 
though themselves healthy, carried a fungus that would decimate nearby apple orchards). 
 39 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258–59 (1964) (hold-
ing that a federal anti-discrimination provision within the Civil Rights Act that prohibits racial 
discrimination by hotels and other places of public accommodation was a valid exercise of Con-
gress’ police power); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 350–51 (Cal. 1979) (up-
holding law promoting free speech on private property generally open to the public), aff’d, 447 
U.S. 74 (1980). 
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they (1) unjustifiably confiscate property that does not cause harm or interfere 
with others’ property rights;40 (2) authorize third party occupation of privately 
owned property that is not open to the public;41 (3) single out individuals 
among similarly situated persons to bear a wholly disproportionate weight of 
an imposition;42 or (4) retroactively diverge from what a reasonable owner 
could have possibly expected when she invested in property and put that 
property to a legitimate use in reliance on existing law.43 
As for interference with the claimant’s “reasonable investment-backed 
expectations,” precedent indicates that regulatory takings compensation usu-
ally is due only when an owner is disallowed from continuing a current use 
that is not causing harm or posing a risk of harm.44 Takings law operates here 
much like state land use regulations that protect investments in prior non-
conforming uses. Uncompensated changes in the applicable standards that 
retroactively impede existing uses—which are quite rarely enacted—are gen-
erally deemed unfair absent substantial justification, whereas the more com-
mon uncompensated changes that impact prospective uses generally are not. 
Finally, with respect to the “economic impact,” Lucas suggests that a 
regulation that deprives land of all of its economically viable uses requires 
takings compensation if, absent the regulation, non-harmful, legally viable 
uses of that land exist.45 Otherwise, though, economic impact of any signifi-
cance will not alone ordinarily give rise to takings liability.46 Only when the 
economic impact is addressed in conjunction with one of the other considera-
tions does it—at least at times—take on meaning.47 Where what might be 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See, e.g., Causby, 328 U.S. at 266–68 (holding that the continued low-lying air flight of 
United States Army bombers above the respondent’s land constituted a taking); Pumpelly v. Green 
Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 182 (1871) (holding that the flooding of petition-
er’s land as a result of the state’s decision to dam a river was a compensable taking). 
 41 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177–80 (1979) (holding that gov-
ernment must invoke eminent domain and pay just compensation in order to turn a privately 
owned dredged pond into a public aquatic park). 
 42 See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 37–40 (2012) (holding 
that the temporary nature of government-caused floods did not automatically preclude such floods 
from constituting a taking); Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 182. 
 43 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 177–80. 
 44 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. 
 45 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that, in accord with the 
majority’s holding, “[a] landowner whose property is diminished in value 95% recovers nothing, 
while an owner whose property is diminished 100% recovers the land’s full value”). 
 46 See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 
602, 645 (1993) (deeming 46% diminution in value “insufficient to demonstrate a taking”); Eu-
clid, 272 U.S. at 384 (finding 75% diminution resulting from a zoning scheme constitutionally 
sound); Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 405 (rejecting a claim that 92.5% diminution in value resulting 
from a new restriction on the operation of brickyards necessitated compensation). 
 47 See Underkuffler, supra note 25, at 736 (“[T]he showing of a landowner’s loss—even a 
significant loss—[is not] sufficient, of itself, to compel compensation.”). 
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deemed a vested right—such as one akin to a prior non-conforming use—is at 
stake, a substantial economic impact resulting from a new regulation could 
potentially be considered unfair. Merely acquiring vacant land, though, does 
not give rise to a vested right, such that regulatory safeguards enacted post-
acquisition that prevent some land uses ordinarily are considered to result 
merely in a lost opportunity that is non-compensable.48 In most takings cases, 
though, the economic impact actually is of little import. Regulations that sin-
gle out specific owners might not produce a large economic impact but none-
theless amount to takings if the singling out is unjustified absent compensa-
tion. Conversely, regulations that do not single out owners might produce a 
large economic impact yet not raise takings concerns.49 
The foregoing summary suggests that the usual driver in a modern regu-
latory takings suit is not, as Justice Holmes initially suggested, the “degree of 
diminution in value”—as calculated by accounting for the economic burdens 
and benefits of the alleged expropriatory act from the claimant’s perspec-
tive—or the claimant’s asserted expectation to use her land for some purpose 
in the future, but rather the “specificity” and the “character” of the state’s de-
cision.50 The courts repeatedly have asserted that determining whether the 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135–36 (stating that the regulation in question will not affect the 
uses to which petitioner had put its property in the sixty-five years prior to the case); Euclid, 272 
U.S. at 384 (noting that the parcel of land in question had been vacant for years). 
 49 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the “risks of . . . singling out are of central concern in takings law”); William C. Haas & Co. v. 
City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting a takings claim where a 
height restriction in San Francisco reduced the value of lots from $2 million to $100,000 because 
it applied to the entire Russian Hill neighborhood); James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empiri-
cal Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 67 (2016) (demonstrating that eco-
nomic diminution in value by itself is almost never enough to support a takings claim). But see 
Michael Pappas, Singled Out, 76 MD. L. REV. 122, 167–68 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court should abdicate the current takings jurisprudence that concentrates on the singling out of 
claimants). 
 50 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1067, 1071 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This position, emphasized in Jus-
tice Stevens’ dissent in Lucas, more recently has been embodied as a principal feature of the Court’s 
regulatory takings jurisprudence. In Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Stevens himself authored an opinion for a 
six-Justice majority rejecting a takings claim based on a 32-month moratorium in development on 
Lake Tahoe’s shores on the view that a temporary—as opposed to a permanent—ban on develop-
ment poses “a lesser risk that individuals will be ‘singled out’ to bear a special burden that should be 
shared by the public as a whole.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332, 336, 341 (recognizing that takings 
law is designed to “protect[] individual property owners from bearing public burdens ‘which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,’” and asserting that “we have es-
chewed ‘any set formula for determining when justice and fairness require that economic injuries 
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately 
concentrated on a few persons’” (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49)) (internal quotations omitted); 
see also San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 109 (Cal. 2002) (asserting that 
reciprocity of advantage lies “not in a precise balance of burdens and benefits accruing to property 
from a single law, or in an exact equality of burdens among all property owners, but in the interlock-
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imposition resulting from an adjustment to a property interest is unfair and 
unjust without the provision of compensation cannot be accomplished 
through the application of a mechanical formula. Rather, this task requires 
contextualized value judgments on a range of issues, including when rights 
vest (on purchase, upon applying for or receipt of a development permit, only 
after substantial construction, etc.), what constitutes harm, what minimum 
standards are consistent with a free and fair market, and what is the content of 
our constitutional norms and the manner and extent to which they unify our 
system of common, statutory, and administrative laws.51 Judgments on these 
types of variables serve as regulatory takings law’s limiting principles. If, on 
these terms, the imposition associated with a state regulatory decision is un-
fair and unjust without compensation, it is compensable; if it is not, the impo-
sition is more appropriately conceived as a responsibility, not a burden, of 
ownership. 
At bottom, then, regulatory takings law offers space not to routinely 
provide compensation to parties economically impacted by adjustments in 
property laws, but, rather—sharing the words of Rainer Forst—to vindicate 
impacted parties’ “right to justification” regarding the fairness of the respon-
sibilities compelled by those adjustments.52 On this view, takings law does 
not inhibit democracy by constraining those collective adjustments to proper-
ty laws that produce diminutions in economic value. Instead, takings law 
helps to guide adjustments to property laws in ways that maintain property’s 
character as a healthy, fair, and just democratic institution. The next section 
illustrates by way of example how takings law ordinarily has served in this 
role to date. 
                                                                                                                           
ing system of benefits, economic and noneconomic, that all the participants in a democratic society 
may expect to receive, each also being called upon from time to time to sacrifice some advantage, 
economic or noneconomic, for the common good”). 
 51 The necessity of taking a normative stance in defining and enforcing property laws is clear-
ly exemplified when one considers whether a person who murders her joint tenant holds title to the 
property the two had held jointly by right of survivorship. See Singer, supra note 25, at 657. 
 52 See RAINER FORST, THE RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION: ELEMENTS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST THEO-
RY OF JUSTICE 2 (Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2012). Forst explains:  
The fundamental impulse that runs counter to injustice is not primarily that of want-
ing to have or have more of something, but that of wanting to no longer be op-
pressed, harassed, or have one’s claims and basic right to justification ignored. This 
right expresses the demand that there be no political or social relations of govern-
ance that cannot be adequately justified to those affected by them. 
Id.; see also FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 265 (“Good reasoning is often stimulated when law-
makers take the time to explain why they did what they did and why they thought a decision best 
served the public interest.”). 
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B. Regulatory Takings Law in Application 
1. Enactment and Enforcement 
Most regulatory takings cases surround allocative choices made by the 
state through the enactment and enforcement of a regulatory safeguard or 
obligation affecting the use or transfer of the claimant’s land.53 In the usual 
case, these types of regulations easily survive application of the Penn Central 
considerations as outlined above, for the ordinary workings of democracy 
usually produce laws that adjust property interests in ways that do not impose 
especially unfair and unjust impositions. Select instances, though, pose closer 
calls. For a comparative example, consider two approaches to serving the 
public interest at issue in Penn Central itself: historic preservation. 
Many municipalities have formally identified certain neighborhoods as 
composed of structures that are of architectural or other historic signifi-
cance.54 Structures within these districts regularly are subject to design guide-
lines that provide a check on construction activities to assure that they do not 
unduly interfere with the neighborhood’s historic integrity. The guidelines, 
then, restrict the freedom of the owners of structures within that district to 
redevelop their land as they please. Governmental entities often justify this 
imposition without compensation on the ground that, as with traditional zon-
ing schemes, setback requirements, and floor-area ratios, these owners are 
reciprocally benefitted by the district designation. Although the government 
certainly should foresee that its decision to designate a neighborhood as his-
toric would present an imposition on those who own property within that dis-
trict, all of those owners not only experience that imposition, but also simul-
taneously enjoy the aesthetic and economic fruits of knowing that their 
neighbors are subject to the same. Any alleged imposition is purely economic 
in nature and rarely of great severity, for the design restrictions allow current 
uses to continue and usually apply only to a structure’s exterior. Indeed, ac-
cording to some studies, properties may be more economically valuable fol-
lowing the designation of their neighborhood as historic than they were prior 
to the designation.55 Moreover, the distribution of the imposition is wide-
spread across all properties within the district. Finally, given that thousands of 
neighborhoods in the United States have been designated historic over the 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 15 (“In the hypothetical dispute widely viewed as the 
norm, an individual landowner desires to engage in a particular land use, only to be frustrated by 
an overbearing regulatory agency.”). 
 54 E.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107–08 (citing examples of historic preservation ordinanc-
es). 
 55 See, e.g., Donovan D. Rypkema, The (Economic) Value of National Register Listing, CUL-
TURAL RES. MGMT, no. 1, 2002, at 6. 
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past eighty years,56 it would be unreasonable for an owner within a neigh-
borhood of any vintage not to have foreseen this possibility. The mere pur-
chase of land should not give rise to a vested immunity from any regulation 
at all.57 For these reasons, constitutional takings challenges to historic district 
designations have found little success.58  
Distinct from the designation of historic districts are those historic des-
ignations of a lone structure within a community, particularly where the struc-
ture was built in the same era as, and in an architectural style similar to, myri-
ad other buildings within the community.59 Perhaps, for instance, a locality 
wants to preserve some piece of its history while facilitating modernized con-
struction. Seeking to preserve ties to a town’s historical roots is almost uni-
versally considered a permissible public objective. However, takings law is 
concerned with the issue of whether a local government is justified in impos-
ing this singular historic designation on the claimant’s property without com-
pensation. 
A local government may have more difficulty justifying the imposition 
experienced by this single owner without compensation than it would in justi-
fying the more generally applicable impacts of creating a historic district.60 In 
choosing to pursue the public end of preserving some piece of its history 
while still facilitating modern construction in the surrounding area, the impo-
sition on a single property owner is acutely debilitating and presents less re-
ciprocal advantage than a historic district designation. The government is well 
aware that an individualized landmark designation in these circumstances can 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107 (noting that “all 50 states and over 500 municipalities have 
enacted laws to encourage or require the preservation of . . . areas with historic . . . importance).  
 57 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 396–97 (holding that the owner of a vacant parcel of land is not 
entitled to enjoin the local government from enforcing any part of a zoning ordinance with respect 
to such parcel). 
 58 See J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings Challenges to Historic Preservation Laws After 
Penn Central, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 332–34 (2004). Some jurisdictions have limited 
by legislation the designation of neighborhoods as historic absent the consent of the owners within 
those neighborhoods or the payment of compensation if such regulation creates an economic dim-
inution of value. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1134 (2017). 
 59 See, e.g., Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 888 (1996) (finding a com-
pensable taking where the state refused to issue a certificate of appropriateness to a monastery 
seeking to demolish one of its buildings). 
 60 Indeed, debate on this point is what made the Supreme Court’s seminal regulatory takings 
decision in Penn Central so contentious. Compare Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132 (explaining that 
New York City’s Landmarks Law “embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic 
or aesthetic interest wherever they might be found in the city”), with id. at 138–39 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (“Of the over one million buildings and structures in the city of New York, appellees 
have singled out 400 for designation as official landmarks. . . . [The owner of one of these desig-
nated landmarks might find] that the landmark designation imposes upon him a substantial cost, 
with little or no offsetting benefit except for the honor of the designation.”). 
2018] Non-Enforcement Takings 161 
produce a negative imposition on the designation’s target, and it may well be 
unfair to expect an owner to have anticipated that one’s own building will be 
subject to historic design guidelines when similarly situated owners are not. 
At the same time, the imposition may not be particularly severe—it is likely 
only economic in nature,61 the owner’s current use may continue (such that 
only a potential opportunity is lost), the limitations apply only to the struc-
ture’s exterior, and the land and structure remain marketable. 
This discussion is not intended to suggest that historic landmark desig-
nations regularly should be deemed takings; indeed, the courts have reasona-
bly concluded in many instances—including Penn Central—that they should 
not.62 Rather, this comparative example is offered to illustrate that, compared 
to the case of the government’s delineating an entire district historic, an iso-
lated historic landmark designation may present a greater likelihood that the 
quality and concentration of the imposition stemming from that landmark 
designation may be unfair and unjust absent compensation.63 The key point, 
however, is that in either instance—whether the takings claim is based on the 
enactment and enforcement of a generalized historic districting scheme or a 
more specific landmark designation—the courts will entertain and analyze on 
the merits whether such a new regulatory safeguard restricting the use of the 
claimant’s land produces an imposition that triggers takings law’s compensa-
tion remedy.64 As intimated at the outset of this Article and explained in more 
detail in the following section, though, the same cannot be said in the context 
of those impositions arising from the government’s non-enforcement of an 
existing regulatory safeguard (or obligation) against other property owners. 
2. Enactment and Non-Enforcement 
It is the predominant view among state and lower federal courts that 
non-enforcement of an existing regulation against other property owners can-
not serve as the basis for a takings claim under any circumstances. The Texas 
                                                                                                                           
 61 It is not outside the realm of possibility, however, that such a situation also might impose 
dignity costs, for serving as the town’s sacrificial lamb may be especially humiliating. 
 62 See Byrne, supra note 58, at 334. 
 63 See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PROPERTY THEORY 180–82 (2012). For a similar analysis comparing generally applicable agricul-
tural zoning districts to “an agricultural zoning law [that] affects only one farm in the communi-
ty,” see John Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,471, 10,484 
(2009). 
 64 See, e.g., Keeler, 940 F. Supp. at 888 (finding a compensable taking where the state refused 
to issue a certificate of appropriateness to a monastery seeking to demolish one of its buildings, 
even though the state issued certificates of appropriateness to similar buildings in the area). 
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Supreme Court most recently asserted this majority position in the matter of 
Harris County v. Kerr in 2016.65 
The dispute in Harris County involved more than four hundred down-
stream residents of Texas’s Upper White Oak Bayou whose homes were con-
structed in the 1970s and early 1980s.66 In 1984, the County adopted a fully 
formulated flood control plan that promised to protect against the one hun-
dred-year flood in those already-developed areas and maintain one hundred-
year flood protection in those areas anticipated for future development.67 Yet 
the County approved a wealth of new upstream development in contravention 
of the mitigating conditions set out in the plan.68 When the downstream lands 
flooded by an event much less severe than the one hundred-year flood, resi-
dents of these flooded lands filed suit alleging that the County had unconstitu-
tionally taken their property by failing to implement its flood control plan.69 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2016). Various other cases 
align with Harris County’s rejection of takings claims grounded in government nonfeasance. See, 
e.g., Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The [government’s] failure to 
[enforce the regulation in question] successfully does not . . . constitute a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.”); Valles v. Pima County, 776 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1003 (D. Ariz. 2011) (asserting that 
“[p]laintiffs have not cited any authority to suggest that a government’s inaction or omissions can 
amount to a taking, and this Court is not aware of any such case law”); Griffin Broadband 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 320, 324 (2007) (“[T]he Government’s failure to 
prevent [an alleged injury] properly is characterized as inaction, and so cannot constitute a tak-
ing.”); Nicholson v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 605, 620 (2007) (declaring that “[i]n no case that 
we know of has a governmental agency’s failure to act . . . been ruled a taking[,]” and that 
“[u]nder the decisions controlling this Court, omissions or claims that the Government should 
have done more to protect the public do not form the basis of a valid takings claim”); Woods v. 
Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. BACV200700099A, 2011 WL 7788022, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 7, 2011) (dismissing a takings claim summarily where the State was apparently aware that the 
claimant’s neighbor violated the terms of a shoreline armoring permit, and the claimant alleged 
that her land was destroyed as a result of the State not moving to enforce that permit, despite con-
tradictorily asserting that the State’s argument that “its decision not to take discretionary action as 
to enforcement of a condition in a license cannot form the basis of a takings action” was “unsup-
ported by law”); Bargmann v. State, 600 N.W.2d 797, 805 (Neb. 1999) (rejecting takings claim 
where the State allowed obstructions on a highway that injured the claimant’s property on the 
ground that the obstructions were constructed and maintained by private third parties with “no 
direct involvement” by the State); Hawkins v. City of Greenville, 594 S.E.2d 557, 562 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 2004) (“To establish an inverse condemnation, a plaintiff must show . . . an affirmative, 
positive, aggressive act on the part of the government agency . . . .”); Grunwald v. City of Castle 
Hills, 100 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tex. App. 2002) (rejecting the notion that non-enforcement of a con-
dition in the claimants’ neighbor’s building permit that resulted in a marked reduction in the 
claimants’ use and enjoyment of their property could give rise to takings liability by asserting only 
that “[w]e have found no authority holding [that] . . . a failure to act results in a regulatory tak-
ing”). 
 66 499 S.W.3d at 795–96. 
 67 Id. at 796 
 68 Id. at 796–97. 
 69 Id. at 795, 797. 
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In the summer of 2016, Texas’s highest court dismissed, in a series of 
terse sentences, the prospect of any form of government non-enforcement 
serving as the basis for a takings claim. The court stated that “[w]e have not 
recognized a takings claim for nonfeasance,” “the law does not recognize 
takings liability for a failure to complete the [flood control plan],” and “inac-
tion cannot give rise to a taking.”70 The court’s only attempt at supporting 
these assertions came in the form of self-serving textualist inferences; for ex-
ample, it pointed to state takings precedents referring to an “affirmative ‘act’ 
or ‘action,’” a “specific act,” and an “intentional act” as evidence that non-
enforcement cannot give rise to takings liability.71 In effect, then, the court 
was operating under the assumption that the state was not sufficiently in-
volved to even consider whether it bore some responsibility for the impacts of 
the downstream flooding. The court only addressed the substance of the 
downstream owners’ claim asserting, as the court described it, that the Coun-
ty’s “doing nothing more than allowing [specific upstream] private parties to 
use their [own] properties as they wish” amounted to a taking of downstream 
properties, and it did not consider the extent to which the County was allow-
ing these specific upstream parties to use someone else’s property by causing 
certain downstream properties harm.72 
The court easily dismissed this claim on the ground that the County’s 
decision to permit private development did not make it liable for the later 
downstream flooding that such development caused to specific parcels that 
the County did not intend to inundate.73 A decision to the contrary, said the 
court, would bring government functioning to a halt, for it would saddle the 
government with liability not only in those instances where it has “designs on 
a particular plaintiff’s property[,]” but also where it merely knows that 
“somewhere, someday, its routine governmental operations will likely cause 
damage to some as yet unidentified private property.”74 According to the 
court, recognizing liability for the mere approval of private development 
would have major reverberations across all manner of government services, 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. at 800, 805. Ironically, these statements sat alongside the court’s grand if unsupported 
assertions that “strong judicial protection for individual property rights is essential to ‘freedom 
itself,’” preserving property rights is—quoting John Locke—the “‘great and chief end’ of gov-
ernment,” property rights are “a foundational liberty, not a contingent privilege,” and property 
rights are “fundamental, natural, inherent, inalienable, . . . not derived from the legislature” and 
“preexist[] even constitutions.” Id. at 804 (footnotes omitted). 
 71 Id. at 800. 
 72 See id. at 804. Some have interpreted the decision in Phillips v. King County as holding that 
the state generally has no duty to insulate owners from the effects of neighboring development. 
See Krier & Sterk, supra note 49, at 72 (citing Phillips v. King County, 968 P.2d 871, 878 (Wash. 
1998)). 
 73 Harris Cty., 499 S.W.3d at 807. 
 74 Id. at 808. 
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from utilities to school transportation to roadway access.75 The government 
would have to pay takings compensation every time property is damaged 
from a toppled electrical pole, for it knows that properties near the poles are 
especially vulnerable to such events.76 It would have to pay takings compen-
sation for property damage resulting from many school bus accidents, for it 
knows that, in operating school buses, the risk of collisions is more likely in 
those locations where bus traffic is concentrated.77 And it would have to pay 
takings compensation for property damage resulting from the many other ac-
cidents that stem from approving driveway access to state roads, for it knows 
that increases in access density increase collision rates.78 In sum, by assuming 
that non-enforcement of existing regulatory safeguards and obligations is not 
an exercise of state power that should be conceived of as capable of depriving 
private property, a majority of the justices on the Texas Supreme Court 
deemed Harris County a relatively uncomplicated case. 
* * * 
This Part has suggested that regulatory takings law is best understood as 
offering some assurance that property adjustments will be fairly and justly 
administered so as not to produce targeted or specialized impositions that dis-
respect the same interests and values that the institution of property is intend-
ed to serve. However, it highlights how this assurance has been deemed rele-
vant only in those instances where adjustments to property interests occur via 
the enactment and anticipated enforcement of regulatory safeguards and obli-
gations, and not to the non-enforcement of those regulations that already ex-
ist. The following Part questions this state of affairs by suggesting that non-
enforcement, like enactment and enforcement, reflects an allocative decision 
by the state. 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Id. at 808–09. The court gave a fourth example that, even on the court’s approach to the 
case, seems inapposite. The court expressed concern that the government would be liable for a 
taking when it approved a high-rise development when it knew it did not have the equipment to 
put out a fire on the building’s upper floors and a fire on those upper floors ultimately damaged 
adjacent properties. Id. at 809–10. It is not evident, though, that approving a high-rise develop-
ment when it knew it did not have the equipment—or, alternatively, an arrangement with a nearby 
town—to put out a fire on the building’s upper floors would be a reasonable decision on any plau-
sible substantive grounds. But see id. at 809 (suggesting that such a decision could be reasonable 
“given [the government’s] tax base or funding priorities”). 
 76 Id. at 808. 
 77 Id. at 809. 
 78 Id. 
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II. CONCEIVING OF NON-ENFORCEMENT AS A TOOL  
TO ALLOCATE PROPERTY INTERESTS 
Harris County v. Kerr mirrors a general judicial aversion to reviewing 
non-enforcement decisions in a number of other areas of law, including writs 
of mandamus,79 criminal indictments,80 and administrative law.81 Perhaps 
most akin to Harris County in this regard is the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1985 
decision in Heckler v. Chaney, which interpreted the Administrative Proce-
dure Act to include a “presumption of unreviewability” of federal agency de-
cisions to decline enforcement action in response to citizen requests. Similar 
to how the Heckler Court rested its holding on the supposition that non-
enforcement rarely leads to direct government encroachment on private prop-
erty rights,82 the predominant view categorically opposing non-enforcement 
takings liability set out in Harris County operates on the premise that non-
enforcement of law is not an exercise of state power capable of depriving in-
dividuals of property.83 
This Part advances the alternative perspective by contending that the 
state should be understood as exercising its power in the property sphere both 
when it is deciding whether to enact a regulatory safeguard or obligation and 
when it is deciding whether to enforce an existing one, for resolving any 
property dispute necessarily involves the state making an allocative choice to 
                                                                                                                           
 79 The circumstances in which a court will order what is often referred to as the “extraordi-
nary” writ of mandamus to compel enforcement of, for example, permitting programs and other 
local land use laws, are quite narrow. The writ, though, has not been abolished. Although the spe-
cific requirements vary by state, a party seeking a mandamus order generally must prove: (1) a 
“clearly-established legal right” to the government action requested, see, e.g., In re T.H.T., 665 
S.E.2d 54, 59 (N.C. 2008); (2) it “is not reasonably debatable” that the defendant has an obligation 
to perform the action requested; see, e.g., Kennedy v. Bldg. Inspector of Randolph, 222 N.E.2d 
860, 862 (Mass. 1967); In re T.H.T., 665 S.E.2d at 59; (3) fulfillment of this obligation is not 
discretionary, see, e.g., Bois v. City of Manchester, 177 A.2d 612, 615 (N.H. 1962); Cooney v. 
Town of Wilmington Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 33 N.Y.S.3d 547, 549 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); (4) 
the defendant has refused to perform the action requested within the allowable time period, see, 
e.g., Vill. on the Hill, Inc. v. Mass. Turnpike Auth., 202 N.E.2d 602, 611–12 (Mass. 1964); and 
(5) there is no alternative, adequate legal remedy available. See, e.g., Flynn v. Town of Seekonk, 
223 N.E.2d 690, 691–92 (Mass. 1967); In re Fairchild, 616 A.2d 228, 231 (Vt. 1992). In some 
jurisdictions, though, an alternative remedy need not be pursued when it would have been futile to 
do so. See, e.g., Mullen v. Ippolito Corp., 50 A.3d 673, 684–85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
 80 Such an aversion is perhaps best illustrated by surveying the very limited types of excep-
tions. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 33 (1984) (deeming retaliatory prosecutions 
impermissible); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27–29 (1974) (holding that potentially spiteful 
exercises of prosecutorial discretion are reviewable for illegitimacy); Santobello v. New York, 404 
U.S. 257, 261–63 (1971) (concluding that prosecutors cannot induce guilty pleas based on promis-
es they do not keep). 
 81 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985). 
 82 Id. at 831. 
 83 See supra notes 65–78 and accompanying text. 
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assign an interest to one party and not to another. The Part surveys a range of 
enforcement-related decisions by which the state allocates property interests 
before ultimately suggesting that non-enforcement decisions, like enactment 
and enforcement decisions, should be subject to takings review to assure 
those decisions impose responsibilities that are fair and just absent compen-
sation. 
Section A contends that the state not only can allocate property interests 
through the direct route of deciding to adopt and enforce new regulatory safe-
guards and obligations, but also through the indirect route of deciding not to 
adopt those regulations, as exemplified through the lens of the well-known 
dispute between the owner of an apple orchard and the owner of a cedar tree 
farm at issue in the 1928 Supreme Court case of Miller v. Schoene.84 Section 
B draws on two examples—Iowa’s “right-to-farm” statute and Oregon’s 
Measure 37—to illustrate that the state also can allocate property interests 
through the enactment of regulations but then formally decide not to enforce 
those regulations in certain instances.85 Section C returns to and reframes the 
conflict in Harris County to illuminate the extent to which a less formalized 
governmental decision not to enforce an existing property regulation also 
serves an allocative function.86 Section D synthesizes the preceding three sec-
tions to suggest that takings law should police allocations resulting from non-
enforcement decisions on the same “fairness and justice” grounds that it po-
lices allocations resulting from the enactment and enforcement of new regula-
tions.87 
A. Allocating Property Interests Through Decisions  
Not to Enact Regulations 
Though vigorous debate persists regarding the manner and extent to 
which the government must be involved for its conduct to be considered 
“state action,” the government’s involvement in some way is generally con-
sidered a threshold requirement for finding a constitutional violation.88 Nev-
ertheless, a number of constitutional scholars have drawn upon the “state ac-
                                                                                                                           
 84 See infra notes 88–115 and accompanying text. 
 85 See infra notes 116–144 and accompanying text. 
 86 See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 87 See infra notes 146–165 and accompanying text. 
 88 One of the Supreme Court’s more famous and expansive interpretations of the state action 
doctrine is set out in Shelley v. Kraemer, where the Court held that the decision of a state court to 
enforce a private agreement restricting “people of the Negro or Mongolian Race” from occupying 
a parcel of land amounted to state action. 334 U.S. 1, 21–23 (1948). Shelley, either as the subject 
of effusive praise or biting critique, features prominently in the scholarly dialogue on the contours 
of “state action.” 
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tion” requirement to distinguish not only governmental from non-govern-
mental conduct, but also to differentiate between governmental action and 
governmental inaction. On this view, only governmental action—not gov-
ernmental inaction—implicates the Constitution. 
This latter interpretation of the “state action” requirement as differentiat-
ing between governmental action and governmental inaction supports the po-
sition that the Constitution provides only “negative rights.”89 Understanding 
constitutional rights as purely negative suggests that such rights only impose 
on the government a duty to avoid affirmative actions that can impose certain 
harms (such as interfering with one’s free exercise of her religion), and not 
affirmative obligations to confer benefits or respond to needs (such as provid-
ing welfare assistance).90 To treat property as a negative constitutional right 
                                                                                                                           
 89 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 112 (1985) (contending that “[t]he sole function of the police power is to protect 
individual liberty and private property against all manifestations of force and fraud”). In an opin-
ion authored by Judge Richard Posner, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals described the Consti-
tution as “a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.” Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 
1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). The court continued, “The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not 
concerned that government might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to 
them.” Id. Similarly, writing for a majority of the Supreme Court in Deshaney v. Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services, then-Justice Rehnquist asserted that the purpose of the 
Constitution is “to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] them 
from each other.” 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) The Deshaney Court ultimately held that the state’s 
creating a system directing citizens to depend on local state agencies to protect children from 
abuse did not support a child’s due process claim for loss of liberty where one of those agencies 
failed to prevent that child’s abuse by a custodial parent. Id. at 201–03. Most all discussions that 
delineate rights requiring state action as “positive” and rights protecting individuals from state 
action as “negative” rest, if implicitly, on the foundation laid by Isaiah Berlin. See ISAIAH BERLIN, 
Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS 191 
(Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1998). The argument offered here 
that property is not appropriately considered a positive right such that the state action doctrine is 
of little meaning in the property context does not broach the overall wisdom of the state action 
doctrine outside this context. Nevertheless, this Article admittedly lends implicit support for the 
view that cases setting out broad interpretations of what constitutes “state action” for Equal Pro-
tection purposes—such as the Supreme Court’s classifying as state action the judicial enforcement 
of a racially restrictive covenant in Shelley—should be considered more important components of 
this area of constitutional jurisprudence than they often are. On advocating such a place for Shel-
ley, see Isaac Saidel-Goley & Joseph William Singer, Things Invisible to See: State Action and 
Private Property, TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author). 
 90 David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court’s Rediscovery of the 
Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 415–16 (1996) (“From a Jeffersonian perspective, the 
essential purpose of the Constitution is not to empower government but to restrain it . . . .”); Eliza-
beth Pascal, Welfare Rights in State Constitutions, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 868–69 (2008) (“It is an 
accepted principle of constitutional law that the Federal Constitution contains only negative 
rights.”); Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 
113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 359 (2014) (“[T]oday most courts and commentators agree with the de-
scriptive claim that the federal Constitution protects only negative liberties.”); Laurence H. Tribe, 
The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of 
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is, it seems, to support the idea that the protection of property is the “key-
stone” to self-governance for two principal reasons: it creates stability in ma-
terial wealth to promote economic investments91 and it guards individual 
freedoms from the tyranny of government power.92 On this view, property 
describes what interests people have, and the Takings Clause protects the in-
dividual negative right to the government’s non-interference with those indi-
vidual interests.93 Certainly social and economic regulations adopted through 
the political process will impact property holdings to some extent, but the 
distinction between protection against government interference and govern-
ment obligations to interfere cannot be obscured.94 The former is superior to 
the latter in nearly all respects. 
This non-interference/interference dichotomy might serve as a useful 
framing device in some circumstances outside the property context. Many 
individual constitutional rights, like free speech, can be considered public 
goods in the sense that, once such a good is produced, consumption by one 
person generally does not detract from consumption by others and no one can 
be easily prevented from enjoying it. Such constitutional public goods thus 
generally can be protected against government interference and exist inde-
pendently.95 As one prominent constitutional scholar describes it, “upon 
                                                                                                                           
Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 330 (1985) (“In our constitutional system, rights tend to be 
individual, alienable, and negative.”) (emphasis added). Professor Serkin suggests that passive 
takings liability is politically plausible because, unlike positive rights that have been advocated in 
the past, such as welfare and abortion, employing the Takings Clause to protect property claims in 
creative ways has long been a “favorite of conservatives.” Serkin, supra, at 360. The modern con-
servative turn to the Takings Clause as a mechanism to protect against government action regard-
ing the distribution of resources is generally attributed to Richard Epstein. See generally EPSTEIN, 
supra note 89. Professor Epstein asserts, for instance, that the Takings Clause should be interpret-
ed to constrain the enactment of zoning codes, workers’ compensation laws, and progressive in-
come taxes. See id. at 103, 247–51, 295–303. 
 91 This view rests on two key, related assumptions: (1) property initially was justly distributed 
in accordance with values that remain and will forever remain in force, and (2) most subsequent 
transfers have been voluntary. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150–55 
(1974) (discussing the “historical principles of justice” that make holdings or distributions of hold-
ings just). 
 92 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 43 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing how the framers of the Constitution 
“saw property ownership as a buffer protecting individuals from government coercion”); see also 
Carol M. Rose, Property As The Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 333 (1996) (ex-
plaining that Ely and other scholars view property rights as the foundation of all other rights in 
society). 
 93 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 97–103 (1977) 
(describing this view of property as the “ordinary understanding” of property). 
 94 Laura S. Underkuffler, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1042 
(1996).  
 95 See Laura S. Underkuffler, When Should Rights “Trump?” An Examination of Speech and 
Property, 52 ME. L. REV. 311, 316–17 (2000). 
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granting one person the right to speak, there is no necessary taking of that 
same right from another.”96 
The idea that property rights are akin to these other individual constitu-
tional rights in providing a barrier of protection against the government’s 
wishes is a prominent and powerful one in the American psyche.97 Neverthe-
less, property rights are, in actuality, distinct from all other individual consti-
tutional rights in important respects. Unlike the subjects of these other 
rights—such as speech, association, religious exercise, equal protection, and 
due process—the resources to which property is directed are finite and, at 
least in some ways, cannot be shared.98 If the state allocates to one party a 
right to control the use of land or to mine subsurface resources, it denies that 
right and those attendant to it to all others. 
Property rights’ rivalrous nature suggests that it is not possible within the 
realm of property to distinguish between protection against government inter-
ference and government obligations to interfere.99 Property is not a public 
good, at least in the terms described here. There is no right—indeed, no 
way—to be left alone when it comes to property. Unlike recognizing a per-
son’s claim to speak freely, the state’s recognizing one person’s claim to a 
limited, non-shareable resource does necessarily detract from consumption by 
others. That is, although the government’s non-interference with one’s right to 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Underkuffler, supra note 94, at 1039. 
 97 JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM 250 (1990) (arguing that the belief that “property rights bear a special relation to liber-
ty” is a “psychological experience”); Underkuffler, supra note 25, at 731 (suggesting that “all of 
us, on some level, believe” in the idea of “property as protection”). Kevin Gray suggests that 
lawmakers often perpetuate this mythical idea of “property as protection” by obscuring the reality 
of property’s contingent nature. Kevin Gray, Equitable Property, in 47 CURRENT LEGAL PROB-
LEMS 157, 159 (M.D.A. Freeman & R. Halson eds., 1994) (“[P]roperty is not theft but fraud.”). 
 98 See, e.g., Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 13 (1928); Under-
kuffler, supra note 94, at 1039; see also Timothy M. Mulvaney, Progressive Property Moving 
Forward, 5 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 349, 360 n.47 (2014). 
 99 Property is, in this way, paradoxical: Many Americans have a deep personal feeling that 
property should be very strongly protected, but there is no way that it can be. See Jennifer 
Nedelsky, Should Property Be Constitutionalized? A Relational and Comparative Approach, in 
PROPERTY ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 417, 427 (G.E. van Maanen & AJ van der 
Walt eds., 1996) (“[P]roperty implicates the core issues of politics: distributive justice and the 
allocation of power.”); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two 
Views of the Castle, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2971, 2974 (2006) (“When owners prove unwilling or 
unable to sort out disagreements about . . . spillover effects on their own, the state [has] to make 
decisions about which spillover effects owners must tolerate and which spillover-creating actions 
they may not take.”); Laura S. Underkuffler, The Politics of Property and Need, 20 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 363, 370 (2010) (“No societally recognized and enforced property right, which is 
‘normatively neutral,’ actually exists.”). But see Eric Claeys, Kelo, The Castle, and Natural Prop-
erty Rights, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 47 
(Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008) (“In all but the most extreme cases, . . . the natural law refrains 
from picking and choosing among owners or land uses.”). 
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free speech generally does not implicate another’s right to free speech,100 the 
government’s non-interference with one’s claim to property necessarily inter-
feres with another’s claim to the same.101 
It follows that the non-interference/interference dichotomy and the at-
tendant vocabulary of “negative rights” thus cannot describe property protec-
tion, for such protection involves the resolution of competing claims. Indeed, 
it is impossible for the state to avoid making a deliberative choice in most any 
property dispute. For instance, whether the state undertakes construction of a 
revetment that alters the flow of water and results in the destruction of neigh-
boring land, authorizes a private party to do the same (either via a formal 
permit or by choosing not to prohibit it), or fails to enforce a permit or order 
to a private party that putatively prohibits it, the state cannot extract itself 
from making an allocative choice about whether the affected neighboring 
landowner’s interest includes security against such a substantial harm.102 Un-
dertakings, permissions, and prohibitions are answers to the question of 
whether the neighboring landowner’s claim to security is valid; simultaneous-
ly, they are answers to the question of whether the builder’s interest includes 
the freedom to rely on a revetment of this sort to protect her land. Undertak-
ings, permissions, and prohibitions all produce property allocations, and they 
all, therefore, constitute available property laws.  
It is not only the allocative nature of property that sets it apart from other 
constitutional rights, but also the content of what is being allocated. Property 
allocates to individuals interests in resources to the exclusion of others that, at 
a threshold level, are necessary for human existence.103 Other constitutional 
rights are of limited import if one does not have access to the minimum 
                                                                                                                           
 100 There surely are very important exceptions. For example, to the extent hate-speech silenc-
es its targets, the government’s non-interference with one’s claim to free speech—for instance, a 
newspaper’s desire to publish hate speech—does interfere with another’s claim to the same. See, 
e.g., Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the 
Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129–30 (1987). 
 101 See Eric T. Freyfogle, Taking Property Seriously, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SUSTAINA-
BILITY 43, 50 (David Grinlinton & Prue Taylor eds., 2011) (explaining that, in such an instance, 
“[p]roperty rights [do] not increase overall: they [are] simply reconfigured”). 
 102 See Saidel-Goley & Singer, supra note 89 (manuscript at 72) (“Either an owner has the 
right to eject a homeless person from his property or the homeless person has a right to enter the 
property to save his life. The state cannot fail to act in cases like this; it must allocate the entitlement 
to someone and deny it to others; there is simply no space within which the state can be said to not 
be acting.”). But see Woods v. Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. BACV200700099A, 2011 WL 
7788022, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2011) (holding that the State’s non-enforcement of condi-
tions to permits issued to the claimants’ neighbors that allow them to build revetments, which 
allegedly led to destructive erosion on the claimants’ property, is a dispute viewed best as between 
two private parties rather than one that the State necessarily must resolve). 
 103 See, e.g., Underkuffler, supra note 94, at 1039–40. 
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threshold of resources to subsist.104 The government must therefore inevitably 
not only make choices as to who gets what, but also, taken to its logical end, 
determine whether some will subsist and others will not. 
These characteristics of property—its allocative nature and its link to 
human survival—put pressure on the popular “negative rights” notion that the 
Constitution provides expansive protection against government interference 
with individual property rights. In one limited sense, the exercise of all indi-
vidual constitutional rights requires the creation and funding of a state infra-
structure to facilitate enforcement, such that all rights, including property 
rights, are “positive rights.”105 However, property rights are positive rights in 
a much larger sense. When the state chooses to protect the property claim of 
an individual to a resource—which, in some instances, is a resource essential 
for that individual to subsist—it is necessarily choosing to reject the property 
claims of other individuals to the same.  
These types of state choices must be made, then, with social goals in 
mind.106 In the words of one prominent property theorist, “[t]here is, in truth, 
no morally neutral place for [property law] to hide.”107 With regard to any 
actual or conceived property dispute, democratic lawmakers cannot simply 
seek to identify the claimed entitlements or expectations of the parties. Ra-
                                                                                                                           
 104 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 
WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 676–77; Rose, supra note 92, at 362–63.  
 105 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Positive Rights, the Constitution, and Conservatives and Mod-
erate Libertarians, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 7, 2013), http://volokh.com/2013/05/07/
positive-rights-the-constitution-and-conservatives-and-moderate-libertarians/ [https://perma.cc/
QA3Q-GS5A] (stating simultaneously that “[m]y property rights in my land are a negative consti-
tutional right against the government” and that “property consist[s] of . . . a positive right against 
the government to protect your property via the court system and the police”). 
 106 See C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITI-
CAL POSITIONS 1, 11–12 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) (asserting that property “is not thought to 
be a right because it is an enforceable claim: it is an enforceable claim because it is thought to be a 
human right,” such that “if it is not so justified, it does not for long remain an enforceable claim”); 
see also André van der Walt, Property Theory and the Transformation of Property Law, in MOD-
ERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 361, 376 (Elizabeth Cooke ed., 2005) (arguing that “a transform-
ative property theory has to be a normative theory that justifies the balance between stability and 
change, in every individual context, on consideration of human values”); Hanoch Dagan, The 
Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1519–20 (2003) (characterizing decision-making about 
maintaining or reforming property institutions as a normative process informed by human values); 
Saidel-Goley & Singer, supra note 89 (manuscript at 69) (explaining that property law is “replete 
with [equitable] doctrines that promote justice”—some based on reliance (such as easements by 
estoppel), others on relationships (such as equitable distribution of property upon divorce), and 
still others on antidiscrimination principles (for instance, laws extending access to housing without 
regard to race, sex, gender, sexual orientation, religion, national origin, or disability)—through a 
“method of balancing [that] is not neutral or disinterested”). 
 107 See Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 84 (2010); see 
also Underkuffler, supra note 28, at 201 (arguing that “[n]o model of property avoids value 
choice[s]”). 
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ther, they must ask what values recognizing those competing claims serve and 
explore the reasons why our society might wish to preserve or advance—or, 
contrarily, renounce or suppress—those values. It is not possible to protect the 
claimed entitlements or expectations of everyone. Property is not impartial; 
instead, it necessarily is partial. In the face of an adjudication of competing 
claims within a particular social context, at least one side undoubtedly will be 
disappointed.108 
The well-known case of Miller v. Schoene highlights the point.109 Miller 
posed the question of whether the state’s ordering the claimant, by statute, to 
destroy cedar trees on his own land to prevent them from spreading cedar rust 
to the detriment of apple trees on neighboring land unconstitutionally de-
prived the claimant of property.110 The Supreme Court rejected the claim, 
concluding that the state “[did] not exceed its constitutional powers by decid-
ing upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another 
which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public.”111 
The Court explained:  
[T]he state was under the necessity of making a choice between the 
preservation of one class of property and that of the other wherever 
both existed in dangerous proximity. It would have been none the 
less a choice if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by 
doing nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple orchards 
within its borders to go unchecked.112 
The decision in Miller, as exemplified in the excerpts quoted above, is at 
once remarkable and routine. The decision is remarkable to the extent the 
Court strongly implied that the case presented a rather unique situation in 
which the state was pressed to choose between conflicting interests, such that 
the state could not serve as a neutral guardian of property rights.113 In this 
rare instance, insisted the Court, either “action” (enacting the statute) or “in-
action” (not enacting the statute) would have profound allocational effects.114 
The decision is routine in the sense that this situation—the state’s necessarily 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See Underkuffler, supra note 28, at 202–03 (“Property’s function, as a social and govern-
mental institution, is the resolution of conflicting claims, visions, values, and histories. In this 
process, some individuals win, and others lose; the protection of some is, inevitably, sacrificed for 
the protection of others.”). 
 109 See 276 U.S. 272, 277–81 (1928). 
 110 Id. at 277–78. 
 111 Id. at 279. 
 112 Id. (emphasis added). 
 113 See id. at 279–80 (“[w]hen forced to such a choice” and “here, the choice is unavoida-
ble.”) (emphasis added). 
 114 See id. at 279. 
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having to choose between conflicting interests—presents itself in most every 
property dispute. 
Miller underscores the reality that the state cannot simply be a “watch-
man” for property rights.115 Rather, by protecting property rights, the state 
intervenes in conflicts over resources; by intervening in conflicts over re-
sources, the state protects property rights. The idea that the Constitution posi-
tions the state as the guardian of negative rights that all naturally enjoy in a 
free and democratic society is inapposite when it comes to property. Property 
rights necessarily are positive rights in that they exist only as a result of the 
state’s allocative choices, choices made with the social aspirations of a de-
mocracy grounded in dignity, equality, liberty, and the like in mind. These 
choices reflect our collective values regarding which claims to limited re-
sources should be satisfied, which claims to those same resources should be 
denied, and what rights go along with those designated as the “owners” of 
such resources. 
B. Allocating Property Interests Through Formal Decisions  
Not to Enforce Existing Regulations 
As Miller illustrates, the state can allocate property interests through the 
direct route of deciding to adopt and enforce new regulatory safeguards and 
obligations on land uses and through the indirect route of deciding not to 
adopt those regulations. The examples discussed in this section—the first sur-
rounding Iowa’s “right-to-farm” statute, the second involving Oregon’s 
Measure 37—illustrate that the state also can allocate property interests 
through enacting but then deciding not to enforce regulations. 
1. Iowa’s Right to Farm Statute  
“Right-to-farm” statutes are common across the United States.116 The 
Iowa “right-to-farm” statute, at issue in the Iowa Supreme Court’s 1998 deci-
sion in Bormann v. Board of Supervisors In and For Kossuth County, author-
ized local governmental entities to designate “agricultural areas” where cer-
tain owners would be immunized from certain nuisance claims of their neigh-
                                                                                                                           
 115 See Underkuffler, supra note 94, at 1042. 
 116 See Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-to-
Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 87 (2006); Jacqueline P. Hand, Right-
to-Farm Laws: Breaking New Ground in the Preservation of Farmland, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 289, 
289 (1984); Susanne A. Heckler, A Right to Farm in the City: Providing a Legal Framework for 
Legitimizing Urban Farming in American Cities, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 217, 217–18 (2012); J.B. 
Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 315–
16 (2000). 
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bors.117 The owner of 960-acres of undeveloped land, Gerald Girres, sought 
this designation from the Kossuth County Board of Supervisors (“County”) 
so that he might construct a confined animal feeding operation, or “CAFO,” 
on his land risk-free.118 A CAFO “harbors in one place thousands or tens of 
thousands of animals along with their attendant odors, wastes, flies, and ro-
dents.”119 Designation as an “agricultural area” would protect Girres from the 
possibility that his neighbors might file a nuisance suit claiming that a new 
CAFO would produce an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of the adjacent lands on which they had long resided.120 After initially 
denying the designation request, the County changed course two months later 
and granted it by a vote of 3-2.121 
Fearing that the planned CAFO would substantially disrupt their ability 
to reside comfortably in their home and reduce the value of their property, 
neighbors Clarence and Caroline Bormann challenged the County’s deci-
sion.122 The Bormanns asserted that, prior to the designation, they had the 
right to file suit if indeed a CAFO were constructed nearby and substantially 
interfered with the use and enjoyment of their land, yet, after the designation, 
they were deprived of this right.123 Deeming this right to file a nuisance suit 
so significant, they alleged that the statute authorizing agricultural designa-
tions amounted to an unconstitutional taking of property on its face.124 Siding 
with the Bormanns, the Iowa Supreme Court held that by licensing Girres’ 
                                                                                                                           
 117 584 N.W.2d 309, 311–12 (Iowa 1998). 
 118 Id. at 311; FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 11. 
 119 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 11. 
 120 See id. The right-to-farm statute at issue in Bormann offered immunity from certain nui-
sance suits to CAFOs in designated agricultural areas “regardless of the established date of opera-
tion.” IOWA CODE § 352.11(1)(a) (1999). To some commentators, the application of the law to 
those purchasers of lands adjacent to CAFOs already in existence arguably poses a separate ques-
tion, for those purchasers made their investment with the knowledge of—and likely paid a reduced 
price because of—their neighbors’ ongoing activities. See EPSTEIN, supra note 89, at 154–58 
(suggesting that notice of regulation should mitigate compensatory awards in some instances on 
an “assumption of risk” theory); Robert L. Glicksman, Making a Nuisance of Takings Law, 3 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 149, 191 (2000) (arguing that a takings claim directed at the type of statute 
at issue in Bormann is more likely to succeed if the claimants purchased their home prior to en-
actment). But see Eric T. Freyfogle, Regulatory Takings, Methodically, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,313, 
10,318 (2001) (suggesting that when assessing whether the government’s conduct reflects a legit-
imate updating of the meaning of ownership, the takings analysis should concentrate on the laws 
in effect and rights held by the claimant on the date of the alleged taking rather than on the date of 
property acquisition). 
 121 Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 311–12. 
 122 Id. at 312. 
 123 Id. at 313. 
 124 Id. 
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creation of a nuisance, the County effectively transferred to Girres a property 
interest in the form of an easement across the Bormann’s land. 125 
The decision is considered by many to be an anomaly in takings law.126 
It has been critiqued on numerous grounds, most persuasively on the possibil-
ity that the court’s holding could be interpreted as freezing in place a particu-
lar understanding of the common law of nuisance.127 On this interpretation of 
the case, the legislature perpetually would be prohibited from reasonably ad-
justing what constitutes harm that rises to the level of a nuisance, whether it 
be to expand the circumstances in which a nuisance might be found or, as 
here, to contract them.128 Doing so would “sever property’s link to the culture 
that it serves.”129 From this perspective, the legislature’s watering-down of 
the state’s nuisance law reflects Iowans’ coalescence on a shift from (a) an 
ecological, agrarian vision of property as protecting land and nurturing rela-
tionships between people and the land, to (b) a vision of property grounded in 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See id. at 319–22. 
 126 See, e.g., Adam Van Buskirk, Right-to-Farm Laws as “Takings” in Light of Bormann v. 
Board of Supervisors and Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Association, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUT-
LOOK J. 169, 189–90 (2006) (characterizing the Bormann decision as “deeply flawed”); L. Paul 
Goeringer & H.L. Goodwin, An Overview of Arkansas’ Right-to-Farm Law, 9 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 
1, 14 (2013) (“The majority of states have reached the opposite conclusion of the Iowa courts.”); 
Todd J. Janzen, Indiana Court of Appeals Upholds the Right to Farm Act, ABA AGRIC. MGMT. 
COMMITTEE NEWSL., Aug. 2009, at 13 (noting that the Court of Appeals of Indiana’s decision in 
Lindsey v. DeGroot “puts Indiana in the column of states” that decline to follow the Bormann 
holding); Renner Kincaid Walker, The Answer, My Friend, Is Blowin’ in the Wind: Nuisance Suits 
and the Perplexing Future of American Wind Farms, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 509, 546 (2011) 
(discussing how the Court of Appeals of Indiana found for the respondent-farm operation, rather 
than the claimant, in a case similar to Bormann where the claimants brought a nuisance suit 
against a dairy farm protected by the state’s right-to-farm statute (citing Lindsey v. DeGroot, 898 
N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009))). But see FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 274 (supporting the 
result in Bormann in light of the questionable lawmaking procedures employed to adopt the legis-
lation at issue). 
 127 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY, ASPEN STUDENT TREATISE SERIES 105 n.17 
(4th ed. 2013); Glicksman, supra note 120, at 190 (arguing that the Bormann court’s decision is “a 
constitutional judicial overriding of the accommodation of conflicting uses reached by . . . the 
state legislature of Iowa”); Walker, supra note 126, at 547 (contending that Bormann “constitu-
tionalizes the remarkably unpredictable common-law nuisance test”). 
 128 See Glicksman, supra note 120, at 190 (arguing that, under Bormann, courts must overturn 
statutes that take “valuable private property interests and award[] them to strangers”). Among 
other assertions, the court’s speaking to the “elemental rights growing out of property ownership” 
lends some support for this interpretation. See Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 320 (emphasis added). 
 129 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 259; see also Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial 
Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247, 266 (2011), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/
forum/the-new-judicial-takings-construct [https://perma.cc/JN95-Z86J] (concluding that the posi-
tion advanced by a plurality of the Supreme Court in Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection would hinder property law’s ability to conform with 
changes in economics, society, technology, and the environment). 
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opportunity, intensive development, and mobility.130 It constitutes a substan-
tive adjustment to property interests statewide, and takings liability is inappo-
site because the legislation did not unfairly concentrate the economic burdens 
of this change. 
It is not clear, though, that Bormann can be so easily cast aside as aber-
rant. The institution of property operates on the presumption that, absent suf-
ficient justification, the government generally will act to protect property in-
terests where a worthy claim is pled. Governance is fair and just when proper-
ty interest holders can seek explanations for the government’s failure to pro-
tect property interests; otherwise, the government need not align its enforce-
ment practices with democratic norms.131 This reasoning supports the simple 
notion that the right to press a legitimate complaint is a crucial part of a legit-
imate property interest.132 
Property rights work only because the state protects them via the law. 
The value of property interests rests on the fact that there are in place trespass 
laws, water quality and other environmental laws, housing and building 
codes, zoning restrictions, and the like that are enforceable. To draw on the 
seminal work of Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, a legal right entails a 
“correlative” duty to act or refrain from acting.133 Professor Hohfeld’s analy-
sis pressed us to contemplate how the exercise and acknowledgement of legal 
rights impacts others, and, correspondingly, how others are impacted when 
these legal rights are not acknowledged.134 If a “duty” cannot be enforced, it 
is not actually a duty, and thus there is no corresponding legal right.135 Non-
enforcement thus suggests that a person who had a duty to act or forbear, 
were that right enforced, actually has a privilege not to act or forbear, and the 
person who had the right to benefit from that act or forbearance actually has 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 37–38. 
 131 Id. at 269, 273–74 (“What landowners ought to have an opportunity to complain about are 
curtailments of their rights that arise from government acts that are not justified as legitimate [and 
uncompensated] changes.”). 
 132 See, e.g., Jack Beerman, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism 
and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 302 (1988) (“Property is defined by the cause 
of action that is available to assert the property right.”); Joseph W. Singer, Property as the Law of 
Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1297 (2014) (“There is no basis for saying that something wrong-
ly impinges on others if we do not have a sense of what we have a right to be protected from.”). 
 133 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Ju-
dicial Reasoning, 23 YALE. L.J. 16, 28–32 (1913). 
 134 Id. 
 135 See, e.g., Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforce-
ment of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 678 (1987). 
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no right at all. Instead, in such an instance, there exists only a mere hope that 
another party will voluntarily undertake that act or forbearance.136 
In this vein, Bormann prompts us to consider not only the person whose 
property is being “regulated” or “deregulated,” but also the party experienc-
ing that regulation or deregulation from the other side. To Girres, the would-
be CAFO operator, the statute removed a substantial restriction infringing 
upon a use to which he sought to put his land; yet, to the Bormanns, the stat-
ute imposed a substantial restriction upon a non-harmful use to which they 
already had put their land long ago.137 Depending on the extent and nature of 
the negative externalities stemming from the CAFO, it is possible that statuto-
rily-mandated non-enforcement puts the Bormanns in the position where they 
may not be able to use and enjoy their homestead at all.138 This view frames 
the question at issue in the following rather stark terms: Is a statute abrogating 
the application of nuisance law in the single context of neighbors of landown-
ers who seek to use their land as a CAFO—which has the effect of making 
the CAFO’s neighbors’ existing homes unlivable—unfair and unjust to those 
neighbors absent compensation? 
2. Oregon’s Measure 37 
The State of Oregon’s infamous Measure 37 presents a similar story. In 
passing this ballot initiative, the state’s voters openly encouraged the non-
enforcement of land use restrictions. The law asserted, in relevant part:  
If a public entity . . . enforces [most any] land use regulation . . . 
that restricts the use of . . . private property . . . and has the effect of 
                                                                                                                           
 136 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 105 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to 
be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.”). 
 137 See Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 311–12. Explained in these terms, the Bormanns’ claim 
relies in part on the theory that regulations that require owners to act in ways that prevent harm to 
their communities should be less likely to be deemed takings than those that require owners to act 
in ways that confer communal benefits. See Echeverria, supra note 63, at 10,485 (arguing that 
government intrusions on private property interests that are intended to protect the community 
from harm at-large are not as likely to be deemed takings as those that are intended for many other 
purposes); Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 26, at 558–59 (discussing when a mu-
nicipality might condition a development permit on a future interest in the permittee’s property for 
the protection of the whole community). 
 138 Cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 263–67 (1946) (declaring low-level overflights 
by government planes that required the surface owner to close his farm amounted to an unjustified 
imposition of a “servitude” on the surface owner’s land absent compensation). 
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reducing the fair market value of [that] property . . . the owner . . . 
shall be paid just compensation.139 
The law operated to modify the substance of all land use restrictions subject 
to it by directing municipalities not to enforce those restrictions if it did not 
plan to pay compensation for the economic diminution in property values 
resulting from their enforcement.140 Before voters substantially reduced the 
impact of the law through another ballot initiative three years later, more than 
seven thousand claims had been filed against municipal governments seeking 
a total of seventeen billion dollars in compensation.141 These local govern-
ments found no viable fiscal option but to forego enforcement of regulations 
on zoning, subdivision, farming and forestry practices, transportation, and the 
like that allegedly diminished property values.142 The statute made no provi-
sion for those persons whose existing, legitimate property uses would be 
jeopardized by the non-enforcement of the myriad rules subject to it.143 From 
these persons’ perspective, the question here is akin to that in Bormann: Is 
Measure 37’s course commensurate with the principles of fairness and justice 
absent compensation? 
* * * 
A more extensive assessment of the substantive legitimacy and takings 
implications of Iowa’s right-to-farm legislation and Oregon’s Measure 37 is 
not necessary to state the threshold point for which these examples are of-
fered here: the non-enforcement of existing property laws is itself a form of 
state allocation that has the effect of protecting some claimed property inter-
ests while imposing real, non-trivial harms on others. Non-enforcement, of 
course, is rarely legislatively codified in the manner of these two statutes. The 
next section explains that, as in the Harris County dispute, non-enforcement 
is far more commonly the product of executive officials’ decision-making.144 
Yet the dual nature of the government’s choice of whether or not to enforce an 
                                                                                                                           
 139 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(1) (2005) (emphasis added) (current version at OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 195.305(1) (2015)). 
 140 See Bethany R. Berger, The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion in Regulatory Takings, 66 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1, 34 (2016). 
 141 Id. 
 142 See OR. DEP’T OF LAND AND CONSERVATION DEV., BALLOT MEASURES 37 (2004) AND 
49 (2007) OUTCOMES AND EFFECTS 5 (2011), http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/publications/
m49_2011-01-31.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8WA-L6E5]. The claimants were using the market value 
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alleged any enforcement of that system was causing their market value to decline. Id. at 34. 
 143 See, e.g., Blaine Harden, Anti-Sprawl Laws, Property Rights Collide in Oregon, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 28, 2005, at A1; Douglas Larson, Measure 37 Puts Newberry Crater at Risk, REGIS-
TER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Sept. 11, 2006, at A11. 
 144 See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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existing regulatory safeguard or obligation—the reality that it necessarily will 
both protect and impose on claimed property interests—is evident in both 
instances. 
C. Allocating Property Interests Through Informal Decisions  
Not to Enforce Existing Regulations 
The Iowa right-to-farm legislation and Oregon’s Measure 37 reflect in-
stances in which the government legislatively codified its allocative choices 
via non-enforcement. Returning to and reframing the dispute in Harris Coun-
ty reveals that less formalized non-enforcement resulting from executive offi-
cials’ decision-making is, too, an exercise in state allocation. The following 
reframing of Harris County is presented not to alter the facts of the case in 
any material way but, rather, simply to illuminate the extent to which an in-
formal governmental decision not to enforce an existing property regulation 
serves an allocative function. 
The County, in adopting its flood control plan by local ordinance, ini-
tially made a specific allocative decision to recognize and protect specific 
claims to property. Through this plan, the County distributed to downstream 
landowners—many of whom had already resided on their lands for some 
time—security from one hundred-year flood events by assuring that it would 
not approve development of upstream lands in ways that would jeopardize 
this security. In a technical sense, the plan distributed to the downstream 
owners a negative servitude on the upstream owners’ lots. At that moment, the 
upstream landowners maintained the ability to develop their properties, 
though they were limited by the flood control plan’s demanding that they do 
so in ways that avoided markedly increasing the likelihood of flooding their 
downstream neighbors. Later, without formally altering the ordinance adopt-
ing the flood control plan in any way, the County adjusted this allocative de-
cision by choosing not to enforce the plan against certain upstream develop-
ment. As a result, the County redistributed the downstream landowners’ secu-
rity to these upstream landowners (i.e., it transferred the downstream owners’ 
negative servitude to the upstream owners), to the point where these upstream 
landowners could (at least with respect to downstream flooding concerns) 
develop their lands as they chose, even to the point of destroying existing uses 
downstream and eliminating or at least placing in grave risk any possible 
future downstream development.145 
The foregoing reiteration of the facts makes plain that the government’s 
decision on whether to enact and enforce a flood control plan will negatively 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 795–98 (Tex. 2016). 
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impact someone’s claim to free use or security from harm. If it chooses to en-
act and enforce the plan, the upstream developers’ claimed property interest 
to build on their lands as they choose will be quashed and the downstream 
residents’ claims to security from a significant flood risk will be respected; if 
it instead chooses not to enact a flood control plan or not to enforce a plan 
that it has enacted, it is the downstream residents whose claimed property 
interests will suffer and the upstream developers whose property claims will 
be sustained. Property interests are both protected and infringed upon regard-
less of the government’s choice. 
D. Allocating Property Interests and Takings Law 
Reflecting on the three preceding sections, it seems that the state has 
three broad categories of choices in allocating property interests. Consider, 
for illustrative purposes (and in keeping with the theme of Harris County), 
the flood control context. The state theoretically could: (1) formally enact and 
enforce flood control regulations that secure downstream landowners from a 
significant flood risk (and thereby constrain upstream landowners’ freedom to 
develop as they choose); (2) refrain from enacting regulations that secure 
downstream landowners from a significant flood risk (and thereby directly 
protect upstream landowners’ freedom to develop); or (3) formally enact reg-
ulations that on their face secure downstream landowners from a significant 
flood risk but choose not to enforce those regulations (and again, if indirectly 
in this instance, protect upstream landowners’ freedom to develop). 
The first option—formally enacting and enforcing flood control regula-
tions that allocate security to downstream residents against a significant flood 
risk and limit the freedom of upstream landowners to develop their land—
mirrors the enactment and anticipated enforcement of the historic preserva-
tion laws referenced earlier. These regulations are subject to a traditional reg-
ulatory takings challenge asserting that they produce an imposition on certain 
users who would otherwise be free to develop without regard for flooding 
concerns that is unfair and unjust absent compensation. 
The second option—refraining from enacting regulations that secure 
downstream landowners from a significant flood risk and thereby allocating 
to upstream landowners the freedom to develop as they choose—protects the 
claimed property interests of those who desire to develop their upstream 
properties without regard for, say, the extent of the development’s impervious 
cover, but does so at the expense of imposing on those downstream neighbors 
an increased risk of flooding. As with the first option, claimed property inter-
ests are both protected and imposed upon. It does not appear that any scholars 
have advocated that the government broadly should be considered liable on 
takings grounds for refraining from affirmatively enacting property re-
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strictions in response to public problems. (Consider, for instance, a situation 
in which the state, on the facts of Miller v. Schoene, chose not to preserve the 
region’s chief crop—apples—by siding against legislatively requiring the 
destruction of cedar trees, or, in keeping with the example here, chose not to 
protect against significant flood risks by foregoing legislative adoption of a 
flood control plan.146) However, Professor Christopher Serkin recently ad-
vanced a theory of “passive takings” that would recognize the possibility of 
government liability in at least some such related instances.147 
Professor Serkin’s theory is best explained via one of his colorful illustra-
tions: Imagine a governmental entity adopts a regulation prohibiting coastal 
landowners from erecting sea walls largely for aesthetic reasons.148 This regu-
lation reflects the state’s decision to allocate to neighboring landowners an 
aesthetic easement of sorts. At the time of adoption, this regulation does not 
significantly endanger the value of the regulated private lands.149 Neverthe-
less, at some later point in time, due to global ecologic changes that make 
sea-level rise in the region imminent, the law’s application has a very differ-
ent effect, perhaps to the point of threatening complete flooding of these same 
private lands because the owners cannot build walls to fend off the water.150 
Professor Serkin suggests that if the government leaves the allocation result-
ing from the regulatory prohibition on sea walls in place when an alternative 
allocation would have (a) avoided the drastic harms borne by coastal owners 
under the standing policy, and (b) been more socially useful, this failure to 
adjust the extant allocation should be constitutionally challengeable as a 
compensable taking under a traditional regulatory takings analysis.151 
                                                                                                                           
 146 The prospect of mudslides presents another salient contemporary example. See generally, 
e.g., Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Damages, Lester v. Snohomish County, No. 15-2-02098-6 SEA, 
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This Article, of course, concentrates on the potential for takings liability 
when the government chooses to allocate by means of the third option, as 
illustrated by the state’s formal enactment of regulations (which facially allo-
cate downstream security from a significant flood risk) that it chooses not to 
enforce (and thereby circuitously protect upstream landowners’ freedom to 
develop). The non-enforcement takings theory offered here might be consid-
ered the inverse of Professor Serkin’s passive takings theory in the sense that 
passive takings claimants seek compensation for the government’s not failing 
to enforce an existing law, whereas non-enforcement takings claimants seek 
compensation for the government’s failing to enforce an existing law.152 Fo-
cusing as it does on the third option of non-enforcement, this Article does not 
present an appropriate space to assess Professor Serkin’s theory in the depth it 
deserves. Suffice it to say, though, that although any further development or 
application of passive takings theory must be cognizant of moral hazard and 
related concerns,153 the theory itself illuminates the extent to which “inaction” 
is very much a misnomer in the realm of property, for property is based in 
most all instances on allocative decisions made by the state. 
The third option—again, non-enforcement of existing regulations—that 
is the focus of this Article similarly illuminates the reality that property inter-
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the non-enforcement of existing regulatory duties: a sheriff’s officer’s refusal to enforce a court’s 
eviction order, see Serkin, supra note 90, at 381; a zoning board’s refusal to grant a rezoning re-
quest when the law requires it to do so when land uses around the parcel so dictate, id. at 382 
(citing Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Vill. of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1999)); and a 
zoning board’s refusal to grant a rezoning request when the law imposes upon the board “a duty 
. . . to relax its restrictions” when the land’s “physical character” changes as the result of “natural 
causes,” making it “no longer adaptable to the use it is zoned for.” Id. (citing Forde v. City of 
Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla. 1941)). These latter examples align more than the former 
examples with the potential non-enforcement takings claims I discuss here. 
 153 Passive takings liability could exacerbate the moral hazard problem that plagues federal 
flood insurance and disaster relief policies. Professor Serkin acknowledges this possibility, but 
suggests that recognizing passive takings liability would have only a minor effect on owners’ 
investment incentives because the chances of prevailing under his passive takings theory are small 
just as they are in traditional regulatory takings cases. See Serkin, supra note 90, at 387. The slope 
may be more slippery than Professor Serkin allows, however. In short, existing regulations are far 
exceeded by the infinite number of conceivable regulations that are not in existence. As Professor 
Serkin concedes, “creative lawyers . . . may be able to identify relevant comparators that could 
make such claims successful.” Id. at 402. In this way, the driver in crafting social and economic 
legislation uncomfortably shifts from the government to individual takings claimants. For a 
thoughtful critique of Professor Serkin’s proposal that addresses not only the moral hazard ques-
tion but also various others, see David Dana, Incentivizing Municipalities to Adapt to Climate 
Change: Takings Liability and FEMA Reform as Possible Solutions, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
281, 287–89, 301 (2016). 
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ests are both protected and imposed upon in most every case. The two 
claimed interests—downstream security from a significant flood risk and up-
stream freedom to develop without regard for impervious coverage—cannot 
exist concurrently. To draw on the words of Justices William Douglas and 
Arthur Goldberg spoken in a similar context, “The State in one way or anoth-
er puts its full force behind a policy.”154 By choosing among the available 
allocative options—which it must do—the state is making property law and, 
in the process, it is both recognizing and rejecting claimed property rights. 
In Harris County, the County created and adopted a flood control plan, 
and, in doing so, it allocated property rights.155 It then chose not to enforce 
that flood control plan, which, if indirectly, necessarily produced an alternate 
allocation.156 The question is not, as the Texas Supreme Court had suggested, 
whether “doing nothing more than allowing private parties to use their prop-
erties as they wish” can serve as the basis for a takings claim,157 so the case, 
therefore, does not raise the parade of horribles on which the court based its 
decision.158 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that the purpose of 
the Takings Clause is to “bar Government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.”159 Takings law should police allocations resulting from 
non-enforcement decisions that allegedly force some people to alone bear 
public “burdens”—or, perhaps more appropriately, responsibilities—on the 
same “fairness and justice” grounds that it polices allocations resulting from 
decisions to enact and enforce new regulations.160  
Following this course, the question in Harris County is whether the 
County’s allocation resulting from its decision not to enforce its flood control 
plan contravened the principles of fairness and justice, as these principles 
have been defined in the takings context through the long line of precedents 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 257 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the 
state’s arresting and prosecuting African Americans for violating the rules of common law tres-
pass by entering a privately-owned establishment open to the public should be subject to an Equal 
Protection analysis). 
 155 See Harris Cty., 499 S.W.3d at 796. 
 156 See id. 
 157 Id. at 804. 
 158 See id. at 807–10, 
 159 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The Supreme Court has cited Arm-
strong in many of its major takings decisions. E.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 304, 321 (2002); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. 
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980); 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978). 
 160 As noted above, according to Professor Serkin takings law also should police allocations 
resulting from the state’s continuing to enforce long-existing regulations when underlying condi-
tions have changed. See supra notes 147–153 and accompanying text. 
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contemplating the considerations discussed in Penn Central.161 Takings law 
exhibits extensive deference to the state’s allocative decisions when choosing 
among valid alternatives. But it does not, as Harris County suggests, provide 
the state with absolute immunity no matter how unfair and unjust the bases 
upon which its allocative decisions rest.162 
* * * 
The proposition advanced in this Part—that the state allocates property 
rights when it chooses not to enforce existing property laws (whether formal-
ly, as in the statute at issue in Bormann and Oregon’s Measure 37, or infor-
mally, as in Harris County), and that such decisions thus should be subject to 
takings review to assure they are fair and just absent compensation—does not 
automatically mean that someone impacted by such a non-enforcement deci-
sion is entitled to the Takings Clause’s constitutional remedy.163 Rather, it 
simply suggests that courts should resist the temptation to formulaically and 
categorically prohibit non-enforcement takings claims, as the Texas Supreme 
Court did in Harris County, in favor of assessing those claims on the merits. 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See supra notes 34–49 and accompanying text. 
 162 This same reasoning lends some support to the view that the Deshaney line of jurispru-
dence exempting the state from having to offer any justification for its refusal to act in many cir-
cumstances—which includes both old landmark decisions, see, e.g., South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 
(18 How.) 396, 402–03 (1855) (dismissing a kidnap victim’s claim that the sheriff unconstitution-
ally refused to secure his release despite knowing that he had been kidnapped and where he was 
detained), and new ones, see, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 767–69 (2005) (reject-
ing a claim that there exists a property right to enforcement of a restraining order under state law 
that can only be deprived upon the provision of fair procedures)—may be due for a fresh look. See 
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1714–18 (2004) (advocating judicial review of agency refusals to enforce 
for arbitrariness); Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on 
Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 253, 285–88 (2003) (asserting that Marbury v. Madison’s command to “say what 
the law is” obliges courts to review the rationale behind agency decisions not to enforce); see also 
Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 791–93 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that where the state undertakes 
an obligation and an individual “justifiably relie[s] on that undertaking,” the Due Process Clause 
“at the very least” demands that “the relevant state decisionmaker listen to the claimant and then 
apply the relevant criteria in reaching his decision”); Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 210–11 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[W]e do not know why [state 
officials] did not take steps to protect Joshua [from abuse by his custodial parent]; the Court, how-
ever, tells us that their reason is irrelevant so long as their inaction was not the product of invidi-
ous discrimination. . . . I would allow Joshua and his mother the opportunity to show that respond-
ents’ failure to help him arose, not out of the sound exercise of professional judgment . . . but from 
. . . arbitrariness that we have in the past condemned.”) (citations omitted). On the Deshaney ma-
jority more generally distinguishing between positive and negative liberties, see supra note 89 and 
accompanying text. 
 163 See Underkuffler, supra note 25, at 746 (“No complex society can adhere to a rule that 
makes it liable for every change in circumstance, disappointment, or frustration that every indi-
vidual endures at government hands.”). 
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The next Part considers the application of the regulatory takings princi-
ples of fairness and justice to the non-enforcement context through a series of 
examples. In the course thereof, it offers two conclusions. First, most non-
enforcement takings claims should be rejected, just as their traditional regula-
tory takings counterparts so often are.164 The rejection of those claims on the 
theory advanced here, however, is grounded not on the view that the state is 
somehow categorically uninvolved in such cases, but rather on the finding 
that the state’s allocative decision via non-enforcement reflected a constitu-
tionally fair and just choice without the need for compensation.165 Second, 
though, as with traditional regulatory takings, some exceptional non-
enforcement cases in which takings liability may be appropriate do exist. 
Namely, liability might attach where the state (a) unjustifiably fails to prevent 
confiscation or significant degradation of a legally recognized interest that is 
not causing harm or interfering with others’ legitimate property rights; (b) 
unjustifiably singles out individuals among similarly situated persons to bear 
a wholly disproportionate weight of a non-enforcement decision instead of 
legitimately adjusting property allocations wholesale; or (c) retroactively and 
unjustifiably diverges from what a reasonable owner could have possibly ex-
pected when she invested in property and put that property to a legitimate use 
in reliance on existing law. 
III. APPLICATION OF REGULATORY TAKINGS PRINCIPLES  
TO NON-ENFORCEMENT 
The foregoing pages have presented two general claims. Part I asserted 
that regulatory takings law generally assesses whether state decisions to enact 
and enforce new regulatory safeguards and obligations that reflect new allo-
cations of property rights produce fair and just impositions absent the pay-
ment of compensation, with the meaning of fairness and justice determined 
through contextualized application of the types of considerations identified in 
Penn Central and elucidated by precedent.166 Part II contended that, much as 
the state makes an allocative decision when it enacts and enforces new regu-
lations, it also makes an allocative decision when it decides not to enforce 
existing regulations.167 Therefore, allocations reached in this manner should 
be subject to takings law’s fairness and justice analysis, too. Through a series 
of examples, this Part considers the application of regulatory takings law, as 
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defined in Part I, to the types of allocative decisions—those grounded in non-
enforcement of existing property laws—discussed in Part II. 
Section A below briefly outlines several situations that, on the approach 
advanced here, should be considered “easier” non-enforcement takings cases 
in that they represent fair and just exercises of enforcement discretion in the 
face of concerns regarding rivalrous harms, competing public interests, and 
constantly evolving human values.168 Section B works through several exam-
ples that present “harder” applications of takings law’s principles to non-
enforcement decisions, including the aforementioned Harris County v. Kerr 
case.169 This latter set of examples is not presented in an effort to offer a de-
finitive result on whether a compensable non-enforcement taking occurred in 
any individual instance. Rather, it is presented to highlight that, despite what 
the many lower court cases that reject the very possibility of non-enforcement 
takings liability might imply, non-enforcement poses some challenging “fair-
ness and justice” issues that are well worth consideration on the merits. 
A. Easier Cases 
1. Trespass—Non-Enforcement Takings Liability Likely to Lie 
A landowner’s “right to exclude” is generally protected by trespass law. 
This right, of course, is not absolute, and there are many situations in which 
trespass law is inapplicable. For instance, where an owner begins to open up 
her property to the public or otherwise operates the property in a manner that 
is more appropriately understood as public than private, the strength of the 
owner’s exclusionary interest begins to diminish and eventually trespass law 
ceases to apply.170 Numerous other doctrines, such as those of necessity171 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See infra notes 170–191 and accompanying text. 
 169 See infra notes 192–273 and accompanying text. 
 170 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508–10 (1946) (holding that a company-town cannot 
criminalize the distribution of religious literature within the municipality); Robins v. Pruneyard 
Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346–48 (Cal. 1979) (holding that a shopping center cannot deny 
access to individuals because they want to circulate a petition to other shoppers), aff’d, 447 U.S. 
74 (1980); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 779–84 
(N.J. 1994) (holding that, subject to reasonable conditions, community and regional shopping 
centers must allow leafleting of political and societal issues); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 630–
33 (N.J. 1980) (holding that a private university cannot evict an individual and secure her arrest on 
the basis of distributing political literature on campus); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372–75 
(N.J. 1971) (holding that it is not a trespass for an attorney and a medical services worker, em-
ployed by non-profit corporations, to visit a migratory farm worker who lives on the property of 
his employer without the employer’s supervision). 
 171 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Magadini, 52 N.E.3d 1041, 1052–54 (Mass. 2016) (holding 
that necessity can be a defense to trespass). 
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and prescription,172 also limit the circumstances in which the application of 
trespass law is appropriate. But where these or other justifications are not at 
stake, there is a strong case that the state’s refusal to enforce trespass laws—
say, where a non-owner occupies an owner’s home by acquiring the keys to 
the home via subterfuge or threat of force—amounts to a compensable tak-
ing.173 Non-enforcement in this instance results in the transfer of a property 
interest that currently is being used as a private home to a third party stranger 
when that property does not bear the markers of a public space, its use is 
causing no harm, and the stranger has no legitimate justification for her occu-
pation. The state’s non-enforcement is not generally applicable, creates little 
by way of reciprocal advantage, and is untethered from any reasonable effort 
to manage social and economic relationships; indeed, it works against opera-
tionalizing constitutional norms of dignity and equality.174 
2. Roadway Maintenance—Non-Enforcement Takings Liability Not Likely 
to Lie 
While the non-enforcement of trespass law in the aforementioned hypo-
thetical example is a relatively easy case in which to find non-enforcement 
takings liability as it has been outlined in this Article, disputes akin to that in 
the Florida District Court of Appeals’ 2011 decision in Jordan v. St. John’s 
County175 present relatively easy cases in which to reject liability. The dispute 
in Jordan derived from a decision by the State of Florida in 1960 to re-reroute 
State Highway A1A approximately eight hundred feet west of its original lo-
cation immediately fronting the Atlantic Ocean.176 Twenty years later, the 
State deeded the original roadway—which became known as the “Old 
A1A”—to St. John’s County.177 Old A1A provided the only vehicular access 
to and ran the length of a 1.6-mile spit of sand between the Intracoastal Wa-
                                                                                                                           
 172 See, e.g., White v. Hartigan, 982 N.E.2d 1115, 1126 (Mass. 2013) (explaining that the 
lengthy use of another’s property for a specific purpose can ripen into an easement). 
 173 Cf. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic 
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1049 (2009) (intimating that landowner A has no legal or 
moral right to call on the police to take down a sign on his neighbor B’s property that expresses 
support for a particular politician). 
 174 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 105 (contending that the government “can’t simply refuse to 
enforce trespass laws,” for such a “deprivation of legal protection would be close to legally de-
stroying my property right. . . . [and] probably would violate the Takings Clause”); id. (“Civilized 
life requires that the government positively protect property . . . [,] [for] while the political process 
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protection is constitutionally required.”). 
 175 Jordan v. St. Johns County, 63 So. 3d 835, 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
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terway and the ocean.178 By this time, the “road” did not include a fully paved 
driving surface in light of erosion and frequent storm damage; indeed, the 
ocean actually had flowed over it on multiple occasions in the past.179 
At the time the County acquired the roadway, several homes already ex-
isted along the road’s frontage.180 In the intervening years, the County ap-
proved the development of additional homes, which, together with the homes 
that pre-dated the County’s acquisition of the road, locals referred to as the 
“Summer Haven subdivision.”181 Old A1A, however, continued to be the sub-
ject of repeated damage from coastal storms.182 The impacts stemming from 
these storms made it difficult for the County to maintain the road, despite the 
fact that, in the five years preceding the takings lawsuit, the County had spent 
on Old A1A “more than 25 times the County average annual maintenance cost 
per mile.”183 Homeowners in Summer Haven found the County’s efforts insuf-
ficient, and ultimately filed suit alleging that the County’s failure to do enough 
to maintain uninterrupted roadway access to the barrier island amounted to a 
taking of their property without the payment of just compensation.184 
With little explanation, a Floridian appellate panel concluded that, re-
gardless of the circumstances, the County has an “affirmative duty to act” 
under state law to “provide a reasonable level of maintenance that affords 
meaningful access” at, presumably according to the decision, all times of eve-
ry day and night.185 The panel reversed the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the County and remanded for a determination as to whether the 
maintenance the County had performed had been reasonable or, instead, “[s]o 
deficient as to constitute a de facto abandonment.”186 
On the theory of non-enforcement takings advanced here, the homeown-
ers’ takings claim on remand is not particularly persuasive. The County had 
provided uninterrupted roadway access to the island for a significant period 
of time despite the increasingly marked and, relative to other roads, dispro-
portionate expense of doing so.187 The impacts of climate change, including 
sea-level rise and coastal storms of greater intensity, led the County to rea-
sonably conclude that it could no longer provide safe and meaningful access 
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 185 Id. at 838–39. 
 186 Id. at 839. 
 187 Id. at 837. 
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during all flooding events.188 Limiting roadway access to the homeowners in 
Summer Haven without compensation is justified on the view that these own-
ers purchased land in a dangerous coastal zone that had been highly regulated 
for more than 50 years, such that they should have anticipated the possibility 
of the government’s interrupting convenient access periodically in the face of 
ecological developments. The type of interest imposed upon—a home inter-
est—is a pressing one,189 though, in terms of the severity of the impact here, 
the County’s decision did not produce an imposition akin to ouster.190 The 
homes in Summer Haven have not been deemed uninhabitable and, at least 
until nature suggests otherwise, the owners can continue to access their 
homes by car when the roadway is not flooded (which, for now, is most of the 
time) and at least theoretically can consider other forms of access—either by 
air or water—when it is.191  
3. Vehicular Speed Limits—Non-Enforcement Takings Liability Not Likely 
to Lie 
For a perhaps simpler, more systemic example of a situation in which 
non-enforcement takings liability is unlikely, consider the non-enforcement of 
posted vehicular speed limits. It is now well established that speeding plays a 
significant role in accident causation. Imagine one’s formerly quiet residential 
street is increasingly used as a cut-through for commuters to get to the on-
ramp for a major thoroughfare in light of new, higher density development 
patterns in surrounding neighborhoods. The street’s posted speed limit re-
mains at a safe twenty-five miles per hour, but drivers now regularly exceed 
that number by ten to twenty miles per hour during peak commuting times 
and only a small percentage are ticketed. Many residents of the street have 
young children who routinely play in their front yards. These residents plead 
with the city to increase its enforcement of the speed limit, but to no avail. 
They thereafter consider the prospect of filing a takings suit alleging that the 
city’s non-enforcement of its speed limit is substantially interfering with the 
use and enjoyment of their land and negatively affecting their lands’ market 
value. 
Though these residents’ plight deservedly will engender sympathy, the 
non-enforcement takings claims here, like those in Jordan, are rather uncon-
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 189 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1007 
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 190 Even if the County’s decision did result in a constructive eviction, it may be deemed non-
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ty. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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vincing. Further factual development of course would be necessary in an ac-
tual case, but there generally seems plausible ground in this context to argue 
that the city is doing the best it can in the face of resource limitations, and the 
residents and prospective purchasers likely have low-cost options to avoid the 
alleged harm to their use and enjoyment (fencing, resorting to alternative play 
areas at rush hour, etc.). Furthermore, any imposition is dispersed city-wide 
(provided the city has not selectively identified this particular section of this 
particular road as an area where speeding will not be enforced regardless of 
resource availability), and, though the city could anticipate that not all resi-
dents will be pleased with all of its enforcement and budgetary choices, these 
residents could not reasonably have expected absolute enforcement of the 
city’s speeding laws. 
B. Harder Cases 
The prior section briefly outlined three prototypical non-enforcement 
situations that should be considered “easier” non-enforcement takings cases. 
The first situation (involving the non-enforcement of trespass law against a 
deceitful intruder) does not represent an exercise of enforcement decision-
making discretion that aligns with the principles of fairness and justice absent 
compensation as those principles have been illuminated through takings ju-
risprudence’s interpretation of the considerations discussed in Penn Cen-
tral.192 The latter two situations (involving the non-enforcement of roadway 
maintenance and vehicular speeding laws, respectively) do represent such an 
exercise of enforcement decision-making discretion.193 Varying these latter 
two fact patterns, however, can make the non-enforcement takings question in 
these situations more challenging. Imagine, for instance, that a county ap-
proved the construction of the first homes on a barrier island and enacted leg-
islation providing for roadway, emergency, and other services to the island, 
only to decide without justification not to spend any of the funds dedicated to 
those services immediately after the home construction was completed. Or 
envision drivers regularly exceeding the twenty-five miles-per-hour speed 
limit by fifty to sixty miles per hour, to the point where residents of homes 
fronting the road cannot safely enter and exit their driveways even at off-peak 
hours. These hypothetical variations illustrate that takings cases involve a 
matter of degree, and thereby reinforce the notion that normative judgment is 
required to assess the character of the imposition resulting from the govern-
ment’s decision not to enforce. This section explores the competing argu-
ments in three actual examples that, on the non-enforcement takings theory 
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advanced here, present especially hard cases. For each of these challenging 
case examples, the section walks through potential arguments on the state’s 
behalf before setting out the claimants’ potential counter-positions. 
1. Non-Enforcement of a Flood Control Plan: Harris County v. Kerr 
The matter at hand in Harris County v. Kerr has been well-documented 
above, such that only the briefest refresher of the facts is in order: The County 
adopted a flood control plan by local ordinance that allocated to downstream 
landowners security from one hundred-year flood events by assuring that it 
would not approve development of upstream lands in ways that would jeop-
ardize this security. This allocation took the form of conferring on down-
stream landowners a negative covenant of sorts that entitled them to partial 
property rights in upstream lots. Later, without altering the ordinance adopt-
ing the flood control plan, the County adjusted this allocative decision by 
choosing not to enforce the plan against certain upstream development, 
thereby effectively dissolving the covenant held by downstream residents.194 
County Positions: Faced with justifying this allocative decision as fair 
and just absent the payment of compensation, the County might contend—
much like the government entities in the road maintenance and vehicular 
speeding examples—that its decision not to enforce its flood control plan 
against these specific upstream developers was an unintentional but nonethe-
less reasonable one made in the face of budgetary and personnel con-
straints.195 There commonly is a wide disjunction between (a) a government 
entity’s jurisdiction to enforce its regulations, and (b) the resources dedicated 
to do so; in this way, non-enforcement of the sort at issue here is implicitly 
ingrained within the regulatory structure.196 A high-level County official 
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spoke to this point at trial, testifying that “[a]lthough White Oak Bayou was 
always a high priority, with limited . . . funding the [County] also had to con-
sider other high priority projects . . . .”197 Perhaps the County did not have the 
funding to support permitting officials’ conducting detailed reviews of every 
upstream development application to assure the developers-applicants were 
adequately mitigating downstream flooding concerns in accord with the 
County ordinance delineating its flood control plan. This reality does not de-
tract from the flood control plan’s promoting the general welfare. Indeed, its 
non-enforcement does not stem from designs on any particular properties and, 
assessed over time and considered in conjunction with the County’s other 
land use controls, roughly assures reciprocal advantages for the impacted 
populace as a whole. 
Alternatively, the County might concede that it had intentionally made 
some decisions to deviate from the flood control plan that were unrelated to 
resource and personnel constraints, but instead were made upon determina-
tions that assumptions on which the plan originally was based had become 
outdated.198 On this alternative contention, enforcement officials might simp-
ly be responding to anticipated legislative action in service of the public in-
terest by deciding not to enforce a law that it appears will soon be formally 
overridden or repealed. 
Either way, the County’s exercise of its enforcement power under these 
conditions demands that its enforcement officials use their discretion in mak-
ing value judgments and establishing priorities.199 In the federal administra-
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 198 See Harris Cty., 499 S.W.3d at 798. Such a decision might be conceived of as an effort to 
counter a potential “passive” takings claim, as such claims have been defined by Professor Serkin. 
See supra notes 147–153 and accompanying text. 
 199 See Harris Cty., 499 S.W.3d at 798. In some instances, enforcement priorities are explicit, 
such as the federal government’s immigration policy under President Barack Obama of deferring 
action for childhood arrivals. In others, they are implicit or even haphazard. Explicit prioritizing 
might be seen as overriding legislative authority to set policy, a traditional separation-of-powers 
concern; however, it might also serve important separation-of-powers principles, such as transpar-
ency and consistency. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration 
Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 208–13 (2015). 
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tive law context, the Supreme Court has deemed enforcement agencies’ dis-
cretionary decisions not to enforce presumptively un-reviewable under the 
Administrative Procedure Act,200 and local government law is only slightly 
more generous in cases involving claimants seeking writs of mandamus to 
compel enforcement of permitting programs and other local land use laws.201 
Much the same could be said of criminal prosecutorial discretion. Non-
enforcement takings law should not divert markedly from this well-established 
course of affording enforcement agencies and officials flexibility, even if the 
remedy generally is not injunctive relief but compensation. Were it to do so, 
in the immortal words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the government 
“hardly could go on.”202 
To further press the point, the County might allege that, outside of ex-
treme circumstances not present here, non-enforcement is best conceived of 
as a risk to which citizens are exposed. Were it not, government incentives 
might be inverted against the public interest. The prospect of traditional regu-
latory takings liability already chills the government’s adoption of environ-
mental protection and safety measures that impacted landowners might chal-
lenge as too stringent. Indeed, full enforcement here could prompt legitimate 
takings claims from the upstream owners. Recognizing liability for the non-
enforcement of existing rules would serve to exacerbate this chilling effect. 
The government constantly would be looking over both shoulders—one for 
those asserting takings claims that the government is enforcing regulations 
that are too restrictive, the other for those claiming that the government is 
enforcing regulations in a way that is too permissive. It might choose, then, to 
avoid moving forward with most any studies and contemplated regulation 
dictated by them, on the view that a governmental entity cannot be challenged 
for enforcing or failing to enforce a regulation that does not exist.203 The 
County’s flood control plan was enacted to protect the County’s residents, not 
to reassign from developers to the County the burden of liability stemming 
from development that proves harmful.204 As it endeavors to implement this 
                                                                                                                           
 200 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985). 
 201 The circumstances in which a court will order what is often referred to as the “extraordi-
nary” writ of mandamus are quite narrow. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining 
the general requirements for a court to issue a writ of mandamus). 
 202 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
 203 See Harris Cty., 499 S.W.3d at 810 (“If the County had undertaken no efforts to control 
flooding, the homeowners could not assert the failure to complete [the adopted flood control plan] 
as a basis for liability.”). For a brief discussion on the prospect of the government’s being consid-
ered liable on takings grounds for refraining from enacting regulations to counter public problems, 
i.e., “non-enactment” takings, see supra notes 147–153 and accompanying text. 
 204 See, e.g., City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 833 (Tex. 2005) (O’Neill, J., concur-
ring) (“[W]hen a private development floods neighboring land, the owner of the damaged property 
will ordinarily have recourse against the private parties causing the damage.”). 
194 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1 
general plan enacted with the protection of the public in mind, the County 
should not be charged with having to forecast specific impositions that might 
result from the conduct of private parties who undertake activities in contra-
vention of the flood control plan that allegedly cause the harms complained of 
here. Any remedy to which the claimants may be entitled—perhaps, for in-
stance, on common law nuisance grounds—must come from the upstream 
developers themselves, not the County. 
The County might offer yet another reason why the takings claim (and 
perhaps a private nuisance claim, as well) should fail: the downstream resi-
dents—by constructing or purchasing their homes in a floodplain—put them-
selves in this situation where they would be prone to injury even from the 
benign conduct of their neighbors building their own homes. Simply because 
these downstream residents or their forbearers were the first in time to devel-
op in this area should not automatically concretize as reasonable their alleged 
expectation that, unless compensated, they have ultimate say in how their 
community develops and evolves around them. 
Claimant Positions: Conversely, the downstream residents might argue 
that the County knew or should have known that its electing this course in 
defiance of its adopted flood control plan would come at the sacrifice of 
longstanding residences in the downstream claimants’ neighborhood. On this 
view, the County deliberately chose not to enforce its flood control plan to, 
perhaps, serve the public interest of facilitating upstream development to ex-
pand its tax base and promote economic development. It might have chosen 
to facilitate upstream development by amending the generally applicable 
flood plan without implicating takings protections, for the responsibilities 
stemming from that amendment presumably would be fairly and broadly dis-
persed. Instead, though, the County vastly increased the likelihood of down-
stream flooding in the claimants’ specific neighborhood as a targeted sacrifice 
to promote these public interests. Concentrated non-enforcement at the ex-
pense of existing property rights of this sort, if uncompensated, can have a 
corrosive effect on citizens’ belief in and respect for the law and, in turn, lead 
to demoralization in affected communities, heightening these communities’ 
members’ suspicions that the legal system will protect them from others’ dan-
gerous and injurious acts.205 Perhaps non-enforcement can be undertaken in 
the concentrated manner in which Harris County chose to expand the Coun-
ty’s tax base and pursue economic development in the same way that these 
goals are considered allowable public uses of the outright exercise of the gov-
                                                                                                                           
 205 See Michelman, supra note 22, at 1214–16 (defining “demoralization costs” as constitut-
ing the psychological impact on non-parties when a takings claimant is not afforded compensa-
tion). 
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ernment’s eminent domain power;206 however, where this course is chosen, 
takings compensation should be due. 
What, though, if the County’s decision not to enforce its ordinance de-
lineating its flood control plan is not justified as serving a public use? Imag-
ine that, in accord with Kelo v. City of New London, the state’s offering eco-
nomic development as its public aim of non-enforcement is mere “pretext” 
for conferring private benefits on select upstream landowners.207 Or, even if 
the state’s decision can surmount Kelo’s pretext inquiry for federal constitu-
tional purposes, it may not be sufficient to meet the narrower understanding 
of “public uses” for which the eminent domain power can be employed in 
many states.208 In this instance, the County’s decision ideally should be en-
joined and the property interest restored to its owners downstream. 
The scenario offered in the preceding paragraph raises the sticky ques-
tion of whether takings compensation is appropriate when it is not possible to 
restore the property to its owner. Here, the County cannot undo the destruc-
tion of the claimants’ homes.209 To some analysts, an inability to restore a 
claimant’s interest is of no matter to a takings case when the state’s decision 
that led to that interest’s destruction did not serve a public use. For instance, 
according to Professor John Echeverria, the Takings Clause assumes the gov-
ernment has the power to condemn property outright for lawful purposes and 
merely places a condition—the payment of compensation—on the exercise of 
that power.210 Just compensation is thus constitutionally authorized only 
where it funds an appropriation that serves a legitimate public purpose. 
Where a state decision is not oriented toward a legitimate public end, the un-
compromising remedy of enjoining the deprivation and restoring the property 
to its owner is more appropriate than the compromising remedy of allowing 
the deprivation upon the payment of takings compensation.211 It is fair to say, 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483–87 (2005) (concluding that the con-
demnation of non-blighted residential properties for purposes of creating jobs and improving the 
local tax base promoted a “public use,” as required by the Federal Constitution’s Takings Clause, 
despite the fact that some of the condemned properties would be leased to for-profit corporations 
for the construction of private mixed-use development). 
 207 See id. at 477–78 (stating that a municipality cannot “be allowed to take property under the 
mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit”). 
 208 Post-Kelo, more than 40 states—including Texas, the site of Harris County—amended their 
laws in a purported effort to limit the extent to which the government could exercise its power of 
eminent domain exclusively for economic development purposes. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 2206.001 (West 2005) (amended 2011). 
 209 Harris Cty., 499 S.W.3d at 813–14 (Lehrman, J., concurring). 
 210 See John Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1047, 1055 (2000). 
 211 See, e.g., Maher v. Lasater, 354 S.W.2d 923, 925–26 (Tex. 1962) (declaring void a local 
government’s decision to condemn a private lane solely to allow a neighbor access to a public 
road in addition to the one to which he already had access, for such a condemnation did not serve 
a public purpose). 
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therefore, that takings law ordinarily rears its head only in those instances 
where an “otherwise proper” state decision to adjust a property law causes 
particular owners to shoulder particular types of responsibilities that are un-
fair and unjust for the state to impose without compensation.212 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (quoting First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)). The chemistry 
between the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause has been 
the subject of extensive debate. Perspectives on the matter, even among proponents of similar 
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equality norms in takings cases somewhat ironically may provide more protections to those hold-
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is illegitimate under what he describes as an “equality principle,” and any such “individualized 
burden” and “unequal reduction in property values” must be enjoined on procedural due process 
grounds. See PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 266–67, 274–75, 290, 
305 (2014). These leading works, among others, raise important questions about leaning heavily 
on takings remedies to combat distributive injustices. Professor Davidson’s and Professor Ger-
hart’s theories, however, would largely resign the Takings Clause to applying only in those in-
stances where governmental conduct results in a physical appropriation of property. Though oth-
ers have joined them in offering arguments worthy of consideration on this point, see, e.g., J. Peter 
Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
89, 114–15 (1995) (arguing that the regulatory takings doctrine should be abandoned because “it 
deprives the state of its basic power to define property rights”); William Michael Treanor, Keynote 
Address: 14th Annual Conference on Litigating Takings Challenges to Land Use and Environmen-
tal Regulations, 36 VT. L. REV. 503, 503–15 (2012) (arguing that the regulatory takings doctrine 
misconstrues the original intent of the Takings Clause and should be interpreted to cover only 
physical takings of property), no Supreme Court Justice in the past century has displayed any 
appetite for considering the wholesale abolition of regulatory takings law. Moreover, perhaps the 
existence of some regulatory takings doctrine is for the better, in the sense that takings analysis—
at least as advanced here—may root out and provide compensation for select instances of rather 
extreme unfair and unjust treatment in the realm of property law that currently are not meaningful-
ly enjoin-able under Equal Protection and Due Process jurisprudence. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington 
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–66 (1977) (finding that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is implicated only in those instances of clear, intentional discriminatory treatment by 
the government, without which even tremendous disparate impacts on traditionally marginalized 
classes—let alone the poor, whom the Court has never deemed such a class—are of no matter). 
Indeed, were regulatory takings analysis to be abolished, there would be no need for the principle 
recognized in some form in a great number of municipalities that, although governmental entities 
need and have great latitude to update their zoning plans periodically, existing structures that do 
not conform with an updated plan need not be demolished immediately when they are not posing 
significant harm to neighbors or the community more generally. See, e.g., Rhod-A-Zalea & 35th, 
Inc. v. Snohomish County, 959 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wash. 1998). 
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Yet it is not obvious that the “public use” clause should be interpreted in 
the formal terms advocated by Professor Echeverria to bar a claimant’s re-
covery of compensation for property that the state has irretrievably appropri-
ated when that appropriation is later deemed not to serve a legitimate public 
purpose. To Professor Echeverria, takings compensation should not be due in 
an instance where the state illegally occupies private property with floodwa-
ters for an extended period of time and it is “impossible to restore the status 
quo ante.”213 He intimates that this conduct bears the markings of a tort, and 
Congress has waived sovereign immunity for takings, not torts.214 Therefore, 
expanding the situations in which takings liability is available cuts against—
through the backdoor—the many justifications for immunity in the tort con-
text.215 One concern with this interpretation is that it could perversely incen-
tivize the state to defend takings suits where property restoration is unavaila-
ble by asserting that, in hindsight, its decision did not actually serve a pub-
lic purpose. Yes, takings law ordinarily rears its head only in those instances 
where an “otherwise proper” state decision to adjust a property law causes 
particular owners to shoulder particular types of responsibilities that are un-
fair and unjust for the state to delineate without compensation. But, in the 
words of one federal judge, it would be “bizarre” to “allow the government to 
profit from its own error” of unfairly and unjustly depriving individuals of 
property that cannot be restored by immunizing it from takings liability.216 
The County might note that causes of action alternative to takings claims 
may be available. It seems at least important to consider, however, the great 
likelihood that the doctrine of sovereign immunity would bar any tort claim. 
Courts also rarely award civil rights damages for substantive due process or 
equal protection violations,217 which raises the real possibility that an owner 
in this position may have no recourse against the state. Moreover, it is not 
evident that the possibility of pursuing a remedy against the state on tort or 
civil rights grounds or against those private parties who conducted the up-
stream development should foreclose consideration of a constitutional claim 
against the County under the Takings Clause where, but for the County’s ap-
proval of development inconsistent with its existing flood control plan, the 
flooding would not have occurred and the downstream homes would not have 
                                                                                                                           
 213 Echeverria, supra note 210, at 1091. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 1092–93. 
 216 Osprey Pac. Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 150, 157 (1998). 
 217 See, e.g., Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Congress Needs to Repair the Court’s Damage to § 1983, 
16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 29, 32 (2010) (outlining what the author sees as the “limited . . . effective-
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tional and statutory rights”). 
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been damaged. To at least some claimants, the flooding damage proved so 
extensive that they could no longer live on the land, and it is not clear that any 
viable non-residential uses remain. 
Seen from this angle, the County’s position takes on a peculiar character: 
The County effectively suggests that it holds the unfettered ability to dis-
place—i.e., to constructively evict via a physical invasion of flood waters 
without providing compensation—even longstanding residents whose uses 
the County concedes are causing others no harm, nor exposing others to sys-
temic risk of harm, through its decision not to enforce a law specifically en-
acted to protect these residents’ lands and prevent their displacement. The 
County cannot justify such authority. 
And, from the downstream landowners’ perspective, the County’s con-
cern that full enforcement of its flood control plan would result in takings 
liability to the upstream developers is unfounded. First, the flood control plan 
allows a myriad of economic uses to proceed upstream; under the plan, de-
velopment simply must account for and mitigate serious downstream flood-
ing impacts. Furthermore, the County can prohibit all development when 
there is an adequate basis for doing so—such as, at the very least, when any 
development would put human life in jeopardy—without providing compen-
sation.218  
The County’s objection that recognizing takings liability for the non-
enforcement of its flood control plan will stymie harm-preventing regulation 
is more formidable, though overstated. Yes, there is a tension between the 
view that we want flood control and other laws to be enforced and the conse-
quentialist problem of what liability for non-enforcement would do for regu-
lation more generally. But simply identifying a cost—or, perhaps as here, 
adding a new cost in terms of liability risk—does not inevitably dictate that 
the state will stop worrying about protecting people and their property from 
the risks of flooding. Every regulation come with costs. These costs stand as 
reasons against the allocation stemming from a given regulation. However, 
what determines the advisability of such a regulation’s allocative impact is 
whether the reasons for it dwarf those reasons against it.219 And, all things 
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les, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 906–07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding, on remand from the Supreme 
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considered, it seems unlikely that governmental entities would decide en 
masse not to conduct flood control studies because the results of those studies 
might lead them to adopt new regulations, which their enforcement arms 
might later choose not to enforce in a way that unfairly and unjustly singles 
out individuals or small groups to bear the negative brunt of those deci-
sions.220 More likely, the prospect of non-enforcement takings liability will 
not discourage the vast majority of governmental entities from conducting 
studies and enacting regulations that prevent harmful land uses or impose 
generalized obligations of citizenship on landowners to benefit these owners’ 
communities. Rather, these are the very types of regulations that, in the past, 
governmental entities have consistently enforced in accord with the demo-
cratic norms of fairness and justice. For those governmental entities that have 
not always heeded these norms, takings liability may well convince them to 
change their approach to enforcement rather than incentivize avoidance of 
regulation altogether. 
* * * 
The parties’ competing positions on the recast version of Harris County 
can be summarized as follows. The County might defend the non-
enforcement takings claim by pointing to (1) the reciprocal advantages both 
in enacting a flood control plan and in recognizing broad enforcement discre-
tion in the face of finite resources (or, alternatively, the lack of a “public use” 
when the government engages in enforcement conduct that is illegitimate, for 
no amount of compensation can justify it); (2) the prospect of depriving the 
upstream landowners of all or a significant amount of economically viable 
uses of their land if the flood control plan is fully enforced; (3) the down-
                                                                                                                           
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 604 
(1982). Professor Kennedy ascribed this label in the context of considering the extent to which 
landlords will pass along increased responsibilities (such as maintaining rented properties in habit-
able condition) to their tenants in the form of increased rent. Id. As Professor Jeremy Paul has 
noted, however, the basic debate plays out in a great many circumstances. See Jeremy Paul, The 
Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1779, 1821–22 (1991) (arguing that Professor Ken-
nedy’s argument applies in almost any case “where the state is considering a modification of exist-
ing economic arrangements that does not disrupt the basic entitlement structure giving economic 
power to one party . . . over another”). For insightful analysis on the topic, see, for example, 
Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fidu-
ciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1244–46 (1991) (responding to 
the argument, based on the “landlord will raise the rent” concept, that requiring compensation for 
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“landlord will raise the rent” argument). 
 220 Cf. Singer, supra note 25, at 633 (deeming “absurd” the argument that people are “deterred 
from engaging in daily life just because every minute of the day [they] are obligated to act ‘rea-
sonably’ to avoid ‘foreseeable harm’ to others” under tort law’s negligence standard) (emphasis 
omitted)). 
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stream landowners’ putting themselves in this flood-risk situation; (4) the 
likelihood that imposing liability in this instance will hurt the very people the 
imposition of liability is intended to protect—downstream landowners—
because governmental entities will cease adopting flood control plans; and (5) 
the availability of potential alternative claims against both the state and the 
upstream developers. The downstream residents, on the other hand, might 
contend that (1) the County’s approach to enforcement unjustifiably singled 
them out to bear the burdens of the public purpose of economic development 
and expansion of the County’s tax base (or, alternatively, the County’s alleged 
public use is pretext but does not negate takings law’s compensation remedy 
when the property cannot be restored); (2) enforcement of the flood control 
plan is unlikely to fuel a successful takings claim by the upstream landowners 
because such a prospective regulation merely would prevent upstream land-
owners from imposing significant harms on other people and their property, 
and thereby allow a myriad of uses; (3) the potentiality of alternative claims 
should not abrogate a legitimate constitutional claim; and (4) the consequen-
tial impact of imposing liability is both less one-sided and more uncertain 
than the County contends. 
The competing positions outlined here do not dictate a particular result, 
but instead merely serve to highlight that non-enforcement takings cases like 
Harris County present more challenging issues than most courts have at-
tributed to them to date. Many of the arguments raised in this discussion of 
Harris County are relevant to the additional case examples addressed below, 
and those arguments need not be rearticulated in any detail. Nevertheless, 
these additional cases also present possibilities for new lines of contention, 
possibilities on which the discussion that follows will focus. 
2. Non-Enforcement of a Pollution Discharge Permit: Swartz v. Beach 
In Swartz v. Beach, a 2002 case decided by the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Wyoming, an upstream coal company allegedly discharged 
more pollutants into a Wyoming river than its state-administered Clean Water 
Act (CWA) permit allowed.221 A downstream rancher, Swartz, contended that, 
as a result of the creek’s contaminated quality stemming from the company’s 
discharges, he could no longer water his hay meadows and his soil sustained 
                                                                                                                           
 221 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1247–49 (D. Wyo. 2002). The company’s permits required the 
discharge water salinity’s level not to exceed an electricity conductivity (“EC”) measurement of 
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permanent damage.222 In addition to seeking prospective enforcement of the 
permit through the CWA’s citizen suit provision, Swartz filed a takings claim 
against the state for the impositions he bore to date.223 
Diverging from the majority view espoused in Harris County, the feder-
al district court denied the State’s motion for summary judgment on the tak-
ings claim.224 Nonetheless, the court did not engage in a detailed analysis on 
the takings issue; instead, it merely explained that Swartz had stated a claim 
that the State’s failure to enforce an issued permit that results in the destruc-
tion of property does not “substantially advance a legitimate government in-
terest” and thus amounts to a compensable taking.225 
The “substantially advance” language stems from the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1980 decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon.226 Twenty-five years after 
Agins and three years after Swartz, the Supreme Court in Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. disavowed the “substantially advance” test as singlehandedly de-
terminative of a regulatory taking.227 The Supreme Court held that this test 
authorized a substantive review of the relationship between a regulation’s 
design and the public goals in adopting it, a traditional due process question, 
only more probing.228 Lingle’s abandonment of the “substantially advance” 
test as singularly determinative of a taking does not suggest, however, that the 
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Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1605−14 (1988); Richard L. Settle, Regula-
tory Taking Doctrine in Washington: Now You See It, Now You Don’t, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. 
REV. 339, 351−52 (1989). The U.S. Supreme Court admitted its error in 2005. See Lingle, 544 
U.S. at 548 (abrogating the “substantially advance” test). 
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federal district court judge who decided Swartz necessarily would now re-
verse course and grant the State’s motion for summary judgment on the tak-
ings issue. The Swartz court interpreted the “substantially advance” test as 
requiring an application of the “fact specific inquiry” set out in Penn Central 
into “all of the relevant circumstances” to determine whether a regulatory 
taking occurred, and simply held that it did not need to conduct such an in-
quiry at this preliminary stage of the litigation to determine that Swartz had 
sufficiently alleged a takings claim under the then-standing precedent of 
Agins.229 
As with Harris County, and particularly unsurprisingly given the Swartz 
court’s cursory and now outdated takings analysis, reciting the facts from a 
new angle brings the contextual non-enforcement takings question into great-
er light. Consider the following recitation: 
In accord with federal and state legislation on water quality, the State of 
Wyoming initially made an allocative decision by issuing and setting the 
terms of an upstream coal company’s permit to discharge coal bed methane 
wastewater into Wildcat Creek. Swartz, who owned land downstream of the 
coal company, held an adjudicated water right. The coal company’s permit 
provided security to Swartz against the possibility that the company’s pollu-
tion upstream would disrupt his exercise of this water right. For the moment, 
the coal company maintained the ability to develop its property, though it was 
limited by its permit demanding that it do so in ways that avoided marked 
interference with the water usage of its downstream neighbor. Although nei-
ther the federal nor state governments formally altered their water quality 
laws in any way material to the coal company’s discharges of its wastewater, 
the state, according to Swartz, adjusted its allocative decision informally by 
choosing not to enforce the terms of the permit it had issued to the coal com-
pany, despite Swartz’s numerous requests. As a result, the state allegedly re-
distributed Swartz’s security to the upstream coal company, to the point where 
the coal company could discharge wastewater so “toxic” that Swartz con-
tended that he could no longer exercise his water right and his soil had been 
permanently damaged.230 
                                                                                                                           
 229 See Swartz, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 332 (2002)). Language in the Swartz opinion—such as the 
court’s assertion that a viable taking based on “a public official’s failure to perform [her] statutory 
and regulatory duties [that] results in the destruction of private property to the point it is no longer 
‘financially viable’”—suggests that, had the Swartz court conducted a Penn Central analysis, the 
rancher’s claim would have been deemed at least sufficient to survive summary judgment. See id. 
at 1263. 
 230 See id. at 1247–49. On this framing, Swartz mirrors in many ways the dispute in Litz v. 
Maryland Dep’t of the Env’t. See 131 A.3d 923, 925–27 (Md. 2016). In the Litz case, the owner of 
a private lake in Maryland, Gail Litz, contended that, as a result of the state government’s failure 
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This reframing helps identify the relevant question as whether the Coun-
ty allocated property rights in contravention of the principles of fairness and 
justice absent compensation. How might the parties respond to this question? 
State Positions: The State might contend that it actually was enforcing 
the coal company’s permit, if admittedly not in the manner Swartz preferred. 
It had investigated complaints of permit violations on multiple occasions and, 
upon identifying areas of concern, informally requested that the coal compa-
ny remedy the problems moving forward. Eschewing the official sanctions 
Swartz desired in favor of more informal measures—such as phone calls, 
emails, and warning letters—is both a less expensive tactic and often all that 
is needed to prompt compliance. Regularly and immediately resorting to the 
most stringent available enforcement mechanisms can prompt regulated par-
ties to be less cooperative in the future on the view that enforcement officials 
did not act sensibly or treat them with respect.231 Perhaps non-enforcement 
takings liability should be reserved for instances in which the State’s decision 
not to enforce borders on bad faith or reflects a complete and utter failure to 
implement a legitimate standing law. To the extent the coal company’s dis-
charge negatively affects Swartz outside of these rare circumstances, he 
should direct his ire and litigation strategy at the company itself. 
Alternatively, the State might assert that it made the conscious decision 
to risk the viability of Swartz’s field by not enforcing the coal company’s 
permit for what it deemed the greater common good of developing coal bed 
methane at the lowermost cost in the midst of an energy crisis.232 Such a deci-
sion is by no means clear-cut, but it is one the State’s enforcement arm should 
have space to make without the constant threat of a takings claim for an al-
leged injury, not to something as intimate as Swartz’s home, but rather to his 
ranching business. That Swartz was “first” to the river’s water relative to the 
coal company does not give him absolute, vested immunity from important 
obligations of citizenship that—much like changing conceptions of what con-
stitutes, for instance, a nuisance—might be recognized in the future. 
Claimant Positions: The downstream water user, Swartz, might counter 
that although the State’s decision to avoid meaningful enforcement of the 
company’s discharge permit is one approach to fulfilling the goal of develop-
ing coal bed methane at the lowermost cost, concentrating this type of re-
                                                                                                                           
to enforce a state-town consent order in which a town promised to address leaks from nearby pri-
vate septic tanks, her lake became polluted and she could no longer operate her campground busi-
ness on the site, such that the state must pay her takings compensation. Id.  
 231 See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1751 (2006) 
(suggesting that enforcement officials’ beginning with less stringent, informal approaches can 
“strengthen[] trust between individuals and the state”). 
 232 Swartz, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. 
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sponsibility on Swartz requires compensation. There is no semblance of re-
ciprocal advantage stemming from the state’s approach to enforcement here. 
That remedies may be available against the coal company (which is no surety 
under federal and state law)233 should not negate the prospect of one’s ability 
to proceed on a constitutional claim against the State where, but for the 
State’s decision not to enforce the coal company’s permit, Swartz’s family 
ranching operation would not have suffered the tremendous damage—indeed, 
destruction—that it did. The state did not change the contours of nuisance 
law, yet it effectively authorized the upstream company to conduct its activi-
ties in a manner that limits the meaningfulness of Swartz’s ability to seek re-
dress for nuisance-like harms. And Swartz’s use of the land was not particu-
larly sensitive but instead rather routine. According to Swartz, the land’s soil 
had long served as the basis of Swartz’s and his ancestors’ livelihood. That 
soil is now so poisoned that it is not only unusable at the moment, but it will 
never recover to its once remarkably fertile condition.  
Contemplating state liability when the coal company may bear some or 
even most of the blameworthiness is not a matter of seeking deep pockets. 
Instead, the key is whether the state owes some duty that it breached here, 
such that it is morally and legally responsible for the harm caused to the 
plaintiff’s property rights. Swartz may well have been hurt by two parties ra-
ther than one. 
* * * 
The foregoing discussion suggests that Swartz, like Harris County, is a 
challenging case when conceived in terms of whether informal adjustments to 
property allocations accomplished via non-enforcement are fair and just ab-
sent compensation.234 The case highlights the reality that whether non-
enforcement has occurred is itself a source of great debate and demonstrates 
the complexity of determining the extent to which competing public interests 
contribute to non-resource-driven non-enforcement. The below discussion on 
the final example, Alger v. Department of Labor & Industry, touches on these 
same matters, though it also prompts one to contemplate the extent to which 
traditionally vulnerable parties might suffer the effects of inequitable, even if 
subconscious, patterns of non-enforcement.235 
                                                                                                                           
 233 The coal company asserted that Swartz could not avail himself of the CWA’s citizen suit 
provision because the state water quality standards that Swartz sought to enforce were more strin-
gent than the federal standards and therefore unenforceable under the CWA. Id. at 1268–69. Sup-
port for the company’s position on this point is available in Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. 
Eastman Kodak Co. See 12 F.3d 353, 358–59 (2d Cir. 1993). Moreover, even if Swartz were to 
find some relief under state administrative law, it is possible that this relief would take only a 
prospective form, not reimburse him for the injuries he already has sustained. 
 234 See supra notes 221–233 and accompanying text. 
 235 See infra notes 236–270 and accompanying text. 
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3. Non-Enforcement of a Housing Code: Alger v. Department of  
Labor & Industry 
Alger involved the alleged non-enforcement of Vermont’s housing 
code.236 According to numerous tenants, the state agency charged with im-
plementing the State’s housing code occasionally issued orders requesting 
compliance from certain landlords, yet for years effectively allowed these 
landlords to ignore order after order regarding the same violations because it 
failed to utilize the code’s enforcement powers to pursue injunctive relief, 
impose administrative penalties, assess fines, or seek prosecution.237 Only 
when it realized these violations had created a collection of such precarious 
conditions (such as no working heat, electricity, smoke detectors, plumbing, 
and leaking gas)238 did the agency act: it ordered the buildings immediately 
vacated.239 The tenants contended that this pattern of non-enforcement took 
their property by converting (a) their right to occupy their leased units into (b) 
“an illusory right to remain in imminently hazardous” conditions until they 
ultimately were forced to vacate, such that they were due compensation from 
the state for, at minimum, their relocation costs.240 
The Vermont Supreme Court’s decision comes closer than those in Har-
ris County, Swartz, or any other reported opinions addressing alleged non-
enforcement takings in tracking the understanding of property and takings 
law advanced in this Article. According to the court, the tenants were not 
seeking compensation based on the government’s decision to order their 
buildings vacated when a nuisance—such as the fire hazards associated with 
the electrical deficiencies—threated the surrounding community.241 Rather, 
the court interpreted the tenants’ claims as seeking compensation for the fore-
seeable results of the government’s “allowing the nuisance to continue una-
bated for so long.”242 The court held that, to avoid takings liability for failing 
                                                                                                                           
 236 Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 917 A.2d 508, 511 (Vt. 2006). 
 237 Id. at 511–13. 
 238 Id. at 511–14, 518. 
 239 Id. at 511 (recounting the state’s requiring vacation within ten days). 
 240 Id. at 521. Like the fee interest in Harris County and the adjudicated water right in Swartz, 
leaseholds have been deemed property for purposes of takings review. See, e.g., Alamo Land & 
Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 303 (1976) (“It has long been established that the holder of 
an unexpired leasehold interest in land is entitled . . . to just compensation . . . when [that interest] 
is taken upon condemnation by the United States.”) (citations omitted); A.W. Duckett & Co. v. 
United States, 266 U.S. 149, 150–52 (1924) (holding that a leasehold is a property interest requir-
ing compensation if taken by the government). 
 241 Id. at 520–21; see also Eno v. City of Burlington, 209 A.2d 499, 504 (Vt. 1965) (finding 
that “[a] fire hazard is a nuisance and the abatement of such a nuisance is not the taking of proper-
ty . . . for which compensation must be made”). 
 242 Alger, 917 A.2d at 521. 
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to abate this nuisance, the government must “lack responsibility for the exi-
gency.”243 
Still, a clearer formulation of the State’s alleged non-enforcement of its 
housing code as an adjustment to the State’s allocation of property interests 
can help illuminate the competing perspectives on the non-enforcement tak-
ings question as it has been articulated in this Article. One might reframe the 
case as follows: 
In adopting its housing code, the State of Vermont made an allocative 
decision in setting minimum standards for the creation of residential lease-
hold estates. The housing code distributed security to all tenants from their 
landlords’ interference with their use and occupancy of their rented units in 
myriad ways.244 For the moment, landowners obviously maintained the abil-
ity to rent their properties for residential purposes, though they were limited 
by the code’s requirement that they provide and maintain boilers,245 fire safety 
measures,246 electrical installations,247 plumbing,248 insect- and rodent-free 
quarters,249 and the like in all leased premises. Although the state did not 
formally alter the housing code, it allegedly adjusted its original allocative 
decision by choosing not to draw on the code’s enforcement provisions—
including its powers to pursue injunctive relief, impose administrative penal-
ties, assess fines, and seek prosecution—despite numerous requests by tenants 
that it do so. As a result, according to the tenants, the state redistributed the 
tenants’ security interest to their landlords, to the point where these landlords 
could wholly disregard the housing code until, if ever, the state ordered these 
buildings vacated. 
Mirroring Harris County and Swartz, the question on this reframing of 
Alger is whether the State’s adjustment to property law through its approach 
to enforcement of its housing code contravenes fairness and justice norms to 
                                                                                                                           
 243 Id. The State had argued that it “owe[d] no duty to tenants.” Brief of Defendants/Appellees 
at 7, Alger v. Dep’t of Labor &. Indus., 917 A.2d 508 (2006) (No. 05-001), 2005 WL 1464527, at 
*7. 
 244 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4457 (West 1985) (“In any residential rental agreement, the land-
lord shall be deemed to covenant and warrant to deliver over and maintain, throughout the period 
of the tenancy, premises that are safe, clean, and fit for human habitation and which comply with 
the requirements of applicable building, housing, and health regulations.”); Rental Housing Health 
Code, 13-140-031 Code Vt. R. § 2.0 (1974) (amended 2006) (“The purpose of this code is to pro-
tect the health, safety and well-being of the occupants of rental housing. This code establishes 
minimum health and habitability standards that all residential rental housing in Vermont must 
conform to.”). 
 245 See tit. 20, § 2881; 13-140-031 Code Vt. R. § 7.0.  
 246 See tit. 20, § 2681(a). 
 247 See tit. 26, § 881; 13-140-031 Code Vt. R. § 9.0.  
 248 See tit. 26, § 2198. 
 249 See 13-140-031 Code Vt. R. § 6.0. 
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the point where it rises to the level of a compensable taking. Once more, we 
can contemplate the parties’ competing positions, concentrating not on those 
arguments that already have been articulated in the course of discussing the 
prior examples but instead on additional lines of argument specifically impli-
cated by Alger’s context. 
State Positions: The State of Vermont might argue that it justifiably 
chose what it deemed to be the most effective approach to enforcement of the 
State’s housing code in light of its resource constraints. Although the decision 
not to enforce in Swartz may have been targeted against a specific kind of 
regulated entity (coal bed methane producers), the Vermont agency’s deci-
sions regarding enforcement are generally applicable in the following way: 
the agency indiscriminately inspects alleged violations as it is able, issues 
notices of code violations, and orders the closure of dangerous housing when 
those code violations go uncorrected. Tenants may not like the choices the 
agency has made regarding the manner of and pace with which it is enforcing 
its housing code. It is far from clear, however, that they hold a constitutionally 
protected property right in their leases as defined by their preferred method of 
enforcement. Whether such a property right exists is particularly unclear ab-
sent evidence that obstinate landlords would be more likely to comply if the 
state were to rely more heavily on, say, imposing monetary penalties and 
seeking injunctive relief than they are under the current policy. 
Claimant Positions: The tenants must concede that resource constraints 
often are a primary and understandable reason underlying the reality that all 
arguable violations of all laws cannot possibly be pursued. In some instances, 
despite diligent efforts, an agency’s limited number of enforcement officials 
simply may not yet have gotten to the file that is pertinent to the takings 
claimant’s case.250 Some offenses, such as housing code violations, occur so 
frequently that avoiding non-enforcement would be a wholly impractical 
goal. That the law’s expansiveness outpaces its conceivable enforcement does 
not necessarily raise concerns regarding the State’s accountability. Neverthe-
less, the tenants might inquire whether there is some juncture at which the 
government’s pointing to a lack of resources loses its potency. Should a lack 
of resources be a perpetually failsafe defense for a state agency’s non-
enforcement when it comes to, for example, a landlord’s ruining tenants’ units 
by failing to fix gas leaks that both the landlord and the agency have known 
about for some time? Is there any limit—even if only the functional equiva-
lent of confiscation—to which select tenants should bear the full brunt of re-
                                                                                                                           
 250 Such instances potentially implicate the ripeness requirements necessary to proceed on a 
takings claim. For a particularly thorough and insightful look at ripeness doctrine in the regulatory 
takings context, see Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in Federal Courts, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
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source-constrained enforcement decisions? Is there any room outside the or-
dinary and expansive space where the state can maneuver in enforcing law? It 
is not immediately obvious that pointing to a lack of resources is a sufficient 
justification for non-enforcement when the state has come up with the money 
to fund a court system by which landlords can evict tenants.251 Why should 
landlords’ property rights to eviction be protected but tenants’ property rights 
to habitable housing should not?252 
In certain situations where offenses are frequent—such as temporary 
trespasses to avoid puddles or to collect personal items such as a child’s 
wayward ball—marked non-enforcement may be desirable. Indeed, where the 
offending conduct is widespread and perceived as only marginally harmful, 
non-enforcement might mirror social consensus that full enforcement is actu-
ally not only undesirable but perverse.253 In others, though, the stakes are far 
                                                                                                                           
 251 On this view, Alger bears some loose similarities to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lo-
gan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. Cf. 455 U.S. 422, 435–39 (1982). In Logan, the state established a 
property right to file a timely charge of unlawful termination from employment and created a 
system by which to protect and enforce that property right. Id. at 424. Under this system, when the 
state held timely conferences, the claimant’s case would be heard in full on the merits, but where 
the state missed the deadline by which it was required to hold such a conference, the claimant’s 
case—however meritorious—would be dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 425–27. The Court found 
this system could serve as the basis for a due process claim and deemed the system unconstitu-
tionally irrational on due process grounds. Id. at 432 (“[A]ny other conclusion would allow the 
State to destroy at will virtually any state-created property interest.”). In Alger, the state similarly 
established a property right (in habitable rental housing) and created a system by which to protect 
and enforce that property right. 917 A.2d at 511. In implementing this system, the state did not 
draw on its statutory powers to enforce the tenants’ property rights until conditions became so 
precarious that it ordered the non-compliant buildings vacated. Id. at 511–12. The Vermont Su-
preme Court found the state’s approach to—its system of—enforcement not as a mere instance of 
governmental misconduct but rather one that could serve as the basis of a claim that the state un-
fairly and unjustly took the tenants’ property rights without compensation. Id. at 521–22. The 
same could be said of Harris County: Instead of the court irrefutably presuming that a lack of 
resources is a perpetual and failsafe state defense to a claim of non-enforcement, the impacted 
parties—the downstream residents who have lost their homes to flooding due to upstream devel-
opment approved in contravention of an existing flood control plan—are merely asking the court 
to assess whether the state’s pointing to a lack of resources is a sufficient justification for non-
enforcement absent compensation when the state has come up with the money to fund a permitting 
system and infrastructure expansion by which other parties—here, the upstream developers—can 
use their properties to produce these foreseeable impacts. 
 252 Cf. Underkuffler, supra note 25, at 752 (asserting that “[i]t is difficult to see why the prop-
erty interests of some should be exalted, and the same interests of others ignored, in a searching 
assessment of ‘justice’”). This choice is especially problematic when it renders people homeless in 
those places where other rules of law make it illegal for homeless people to exist anywhere at all. 
See Mulvaney & Singer, supra note 13, at 1 (“When cities prohibit sleeping on sidewalks and in 
parks, those homeless persons whom the police ask to ‘move along’ from these public spaces have 
begun to respond with a simple question: ‘Move along to where?’”). 
 253 See, e.g., Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1400 
nn.16–18 (2002) (discussing this possibility in the context of enforcing underage drinking in col-
lege towns). 
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higher, such as the ability to reasonably conduct one’s longstanding family 
business (as in Swartz),254 or, even more importantly, as here, to occupy the 
home one has lived in for some time and planned to remain in for the consid-
erable future given its proximity to, say, the occupants’ employment and their 
children’s schools.255 
The tenants are not baldly claiming that they have been deprived of a 
right to the State’s enforcing the law. Rather, they are asserting that the State 
has deprived them of a right to continue occupying the premises they rented, 
and that non-enforcement of the housing code is the mechanism for the dep-
rivation. The housing code creates property rights in tenants to habitable 
housing that only exist or vest if the conduct of other property owners—their 
landlords—is regulated and the interests of these other owners are subjected 
to a covenant of sorts. The State’s non-enforcement of this covenant has pro-
duced not the constructive, moral equivalent of divestment and eviction here, 
but divestment and eviction itself. The State’s allowing, in the Vermont Su-
preme Court’s words, “the nuisance to continue unabated for so long”256 re-
sulted in the tenants being unable to use their residences at all. Is eviction in 
these circumstances to be treated merely “as part of the burden of common 
citizenship,”257 such that it is justified even without compensation for the ten-
ants’ cost of finding alternative housing?258 Does a leasehold estate include 
any protection at all against the state’s unfairly and unjustifiably putting a 
tenant out on the street without compensation? 
The tenants might concede that there is no direct evidence that the 
State’s non-enforcement of the housing code is the product of intentional hos-
tility toward certain individuals or groups, which might result from an official 
discriminatory policy or stem from individual executive officers’ biases 
through which certain tenants’ complaints constantly find their way to the 
                                                                                                                           
 254 See supra notes 221–233 and accompanying text (discussing the Swartz case). 
 255 See supra notes 194–220 and accompanying text (discussing Harris County). 
 256 Alger, 917 A.2d at 521. 
 257 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949). 
 258 The precise measure of compensation for a non-enforcement taking is fodder for future 
work. Takings compensation generally is measured by what the government gets, not what the 
tenant lost. On the facts of Alger, the government could be understood to have reaped the market 
value of refusing to enforce the housing code to the point where that decision resulted in the dep-
rivation of the tenants’ right to continue occupying their leased premises. See 917 A.2d at 511–14. 
Somewhat peculiarly, it is also doctrinally possible that a court could find a taking occurred but no 
compensation is due. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 
2597 (2013) (explaining that compensation may not be available for “unconstitutional conditions 
claims predicated on the Takings Clause”); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 
N.E.2d 428, 434–35 (N.Y. 1983) (holding, on remand following the Supreme Court’s conclusion 
that a regulation authorizing cable wiring on the claimant’s building constituted a taking, that 
nominal compensation of one dollar was due).  
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bottom of the government’s priority list. But if not overtly intentional, non-
enforcement nonetheless can result from the reactionary tendency to steer the 
benefits of enforcement against the politically powerless.259 These tenants may 
be unable to summon their political representatives and institutions to respond 
to their rights and needs. In this context, political powerlessness and need may 
present an especially dangerous combination: the poorest areas need the most 
enforcement of statewide housing codes, yet wealthy communities with min-
imal housing code issues may be loath to support the direction of their tax 
monies to this purpose.260 The general applicability of the state’s approach to 
enforcement is, on this view, not a positive characteristic here, but instead 
reflects this approach’s unreserved failure to account for the needs of its most 
vulnerable citizens—the very low-income tenants housing codes are most 
prominently enacted to protect.261 
It bears keeping in mind, though, that although traditionally vulnerable 
persons and groups often shoulder the negative impacts of non-enforcement, 
decisions not to enforce also can assist and even empower these same vulner-
able individuals and groups. In their characteristically imaginative way, Pro-
fessors Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal have explained that employing a 
machine that could identify and enjoin every violation of an existing property 
law would disregard two important precepts advanced by those “outlaws” 
who engage in such facially proscribed acts.262 First, some violations of prop-
erty rights can lead to democratic action that furthers a more just distribu-
tion.263 For example, Native Americans’ occupation of Alcatraz Island led to 
policy changes supporting tribes.264 Second, violations of property rights can 
provide information that disproves widespread understandings and thereby 
shed light on the injustices of existing laws.265 Some laws, that is, do need to 
be called into question. For instance, lunch counter sit-ins disproved the pre-
vailing view among many southern whites that blacks liked the segregation of 
Jim Crow.266 From a functional perspective, violating existing property laws 
                                                                                                                           
 259 In turn, Swartz raises the possibility of the inverse phenomenon: steering the benefits of 
enforcement toward the politically powerful. See supra notes 221–233 and accompanying text. 
 260 See generally Natapoff, supra note 231 (making a similar point in the context enforcing 
criminal laws). 
 261 Cf. Dukes v. Durante, 471 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Conn. 1984) (“[C]ommon sense and reason 
compel the conclusion that the [state] defendants cannot act under the housing code, which is to 
protect the health and safety of the occupants, and then abandon the displacees.”). 
 262 EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, 
PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 143–65 (2010). 
 263 Id. at 143–58. 
 264 Id. at vii–viii. 
 265 Id. at 159–65. 
 266 Id. at 64–70. Professor Alexandra Natapoff argues that, in the context of civil disobedi-
ence, “underenforcement is a sign of truly responsive government, one that recognizes that not all 
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is one of the few tools available for those who have been marginalized by the 
current delineation and allocation of property interests to express concerns 
about distributive justice.267 
In addition to those precepts noted by Professors Peñalver and Katyal, 
there are also some instances where an accounting of the human stories be-
hind the particular lawbreaker and that lawbreaker’s objectors might counsel 
in favor of non-enforcement.268 For one prominent example, a federal district 
court concluded that the City of Miami could not arrest homeless people for 
urinating in public when the city did not offer enough beds in city shelters to 
accommodate its homeless population,269 though the court’s decision did not 
impede continued enforcement of the city’s prohibition on public urination 
against members of less vulnerable populations, including, as it were, profes-
sional football players.270 
The Alcatraz occupation, lunch counter sit-in, and public urination ex-
amples illustrate the possibility that non-enforcement can serve to vindicate 
interests that sit in competition with those that underlie the law that the state 
is choosing not to enforce. Determining whether and in what precise circum-
stances it would be fair to deem the interests served by non-enforcement su-
perior to those served by enforcement without affording compensation to 
those negatively impacted parties poses marked challenges. However, that 
these examples exist at all reveals non-enforcement’s role as a mechanism by 
which property allocations can be adjusted in the face of changing social and 
economic conditions and evolving moral positions on the values that we most 
cherish. Though an admittedly weighty task, perhaps takings law can, in cases 
such as Alger, play a role in enhancing our democracy by ensuring that un-
compensated adjustments made via non-enforcement occur in a fair and just 
manner. 
* * * 
                                                                                                                           
laws deserve to be enforced all of the time and that principles of democratic accountability some-
times require law enforcement to make room for public deviance.” See Natapoff, supra note 231, 
at 1743. 
 267 See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 262, at 14. 
 268 See, e.g., Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions, supra note 26, at 164–65 (suggesting that the 
identity of the parties involved in property disputes should be considered at times); Underkuffler, 
supra note 99, at 363–66 (discussing PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 262, and noting the im-
portance of the identities of both lawbreakers and their objectors in certain cases). 
 269 Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1582–85 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see also Magadini, 
52 N.E.3d at 1051 (“[T]he necessity defense allows a jury to consider the plight of a homeless person 
against any harms caused by a trespass before determining criminal responsibility.”). 
 270 See, e.g., Kyle Munzenrieder, Former Dolphin Tyrell Johnson Arrested for Peeing in Pub-
lic on Miami Beach, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/
former-dolphin-tyrell-johnson-arrested-for-peeing-in-public-on-miami-beach-6527133 [https://
perma.cc/2YK8-G54U]; see also Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions, supra note 26, at 167–68. 
212 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1 
Like Harris County and Swartz, Alger presents a challenging case when 
conceived in terms of whether adjustments to property allocations accom-
plished via non-enforcement align with the principles of fairness and justice 
absent compensation. Among other issues, the case reiterates, and in some 
ways strengthens, the importance of deferring to state decisions to establish 
priorities in the face of resource constraints. At the same time, though, it 
brings into view the distinct possibility that traditionally vulnerable parties 
might suffer the effects of imbalanced dedications of enforcement resources, 
which, here, may well have produced the devastating effect of exacerbating 
homelessness. 
C. Summary—Non-Enforcement Takings 
The preceding sections illustrate through several contemporary exam-
ples how one might evaluate a non-enforcement decision’s alignment with 
fairness and justice as those principles have been illuminated through regula-
tory takings precedent explicitly or implicitly interpreting the considerations 
discussed as relevant in Penn Central. Some examples—including those in-
volving the non-enforcement of trespass laws, roadway maintenance provi-
sions, and vehicular speed limits—present relatively non-controversial tak-
ings issues.271 The non-enforcement of a flood control plan, a water pollution 
discharge permit, and a housing code, however, are more challenging on 
these terms in light of the context within which they arose in Harris County, 
Swartz, and Alger, respectively.272 In short, the claimants in these cases sug-
gest that they are unfairly and unjustly tasked with shouldering, via non-
enforcement, a burden of a type and severity that is not borne by similarly 
situated parties and that they should not have been saddled with anticipating. 
Meanwhile, the government entities contend that these impositions do not 
amount to compensable burdens, but instead should be considered broadly 
reciprocated obligations of ownership in service of the public interest that are 
fair and just without compensation. In sum, the discussion in this Part sug-
gests that the government’s decision not to enforce an existing property regu-
lation can, albeit in very rare instances, present a situation in which takings 
liability should be considered a viable option.273 
                                                                                                                           
 271 See supra notes 170–191 and accompanying text. 
 272 See supra notes 192–270 and accompanying text. 
 273 Although the concentration here is on takings law, it bears mentioning that there may well 
be alternative, non-constitutional mechanisms that present a course to provide at least partial pro-
tections for those unfairly bearing the weight of non-enforcement decisions, such as the flood-
prone homeowners in Harris County, the downstream rancher unable to water his crops in Swartz, 
and the displaced tenants in Alger. For one example, courts might prompt legislatures to allocate 
enforcement funding in a more just manner, as exhibited in some school funding jurisprudence. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article makes three preliminary claims on which its theory of non-
enforcement takings liability rests. First, whatever the value of describing 
certain constitutional rights as “negative” in the sense that they afford protec-
tion against government interference, this vocabulary is not adequate to ex-
plain the institution of property. Although the government’s non-interference 
with one’s constitutional right to, say, association or free speech generally 
does not implicate others’ rights to associate or speak freely, the government’s 
“non-interference” with one’s claim to property necessarily interferes with 
others’ claims to the same. Second, a system of private property in a constitu-
tional democracy demands that the state make allocative choices through the 
definition and enforcement of property rights. Therefore, the usefulness of 
distinguishing between state “action” and state “inaction” in the property 
sphere is not evident, for both “action” (say, enacting and enforcing a statute) 
and “inaction” (not enforcing an enacted statute or not enacting the statute at 
all) are decisions that have profound allocational effects. The state unavoida-
bly has to choose between conflicting interests in most every property dis-
pute. Third, these allocative choices must be made with reference to social 
goals; therefore, the same normative judgments that underlie the enactment 
and enforcement of new laws underlie the non-enforcement of existing ones. 
From these preliminary claims, the following thesis emerges: The non-
enforcement of existing property laws is not logically separable from the is-
sue of unfair and unjust state deprivations of property rights at which the 
Constitution’s Takings Clause takes aim. This Article suggests that takings 
law should police allocations resulting from non-enforcement decisions on 
the same “fairness and justice” grounds that it polices allocations resulting 
from decisions to enact and enforce new regulations. Rejecting the extant ma-
jority position that state decisions not to enforce existing property laws are 
                                                                                                                           
See, e.g., Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 397 (Vt. 1997) (holding that the state of Vermont’s 
public school funding program “violates the right to equal educational opportunities under . . . the 
Vermont Constitution). Another example of such jurisprudence is the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s innovative decisions regarding the provision of affordable housing. See, e.g., S. Burling-
ton Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 490 (N.J. 1983) (holding that the town-
ship must provide “a realistic opportunity for [affordable] housing” to the economically disadvan-
taged). For a third example, perhaps the legislature might impose on itself, local governments, and 
those administrative agencies with the power to enact regulations a requirement to outline in more 
detail than they often do the methods by which new laws and regulations should be enforced, 
particularly in the face of resource and personnel constraints. Where enforcement officials diverge 
from these methods, the burden of persuasion might shift to the government to justify this diver-
gence or offer some form of transition relief. New applications of existing common or statutory 
laws and proposed adjustments to these non-constitutional bodies of law on behalf of those im-
pacted by non-enforcement can serve as fodder for future work. 
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categorically immune from takings liability is not to advocate that persons 
impacted by such decisions should be automatically or even regularly entitled 
to the Takings Clause’s constitutional remedy. Rather, it simply suggests that 
courts should resist the temptation to formulaically and categorically prohibit 
non-enforcement takings claims in favor of assessing those claims on the 
merits. 
What might such a merits-based assessment entail? Regulatory takings 
law, if imperfectly, recognizes that the socially-crafted nature of the institu-
tion of property makes property rights accountable to the values that charac-
terize our democracy, such that the substance of property laws must be collec-
tively adjusted as social, economic, and moral perspectives on the content of 
these values—and conceptions of what might harm these values—change 
over time. At the same time, though, this body of law reflects the judiciary’s 
appreciation for the idea that property owners and non-owners alike expect 
that these adjustments to property laws will be made in accord with the dem-
ocratic principles of “fairness and justice,” the meaning of which are to be 
determined through contextualized application of the types of considerations 
set out in Penn Central and elaborated by precedent. 
Non-enforcement takings law generally should track this same course. 
Takings claims grounded in non-enforcement should be as unlikely to suc-
ceed as traditional regulatory takings claims in light of the broad deference 
afforded to state officials tasked with implementing democratically-enacted 
regulatory safeguards and obligations in the face of resource and personnel 
constraints, concerns regarding rivalrous harms, competing public interests, 
and constantly evolving human values. Nevertheless, there are some extreme 
cases in which it is not fair or just for the state to decline to enforce existing 
law without adequate justification for its refusal to provide compensation. 
Although there are no rigid lines, non-enforcement takings claims, as in the 
regulatory takings context, should be more likely to trigger takings liability 
when the state’s decision (1) unjustifiably fails to prevent confiscation or sig-
nificant degradation of a legally recognized interest (such as a covenant or 
nuisance-like property right) that is not causing harm or interfering with oth-
ers’ legitimate property rights; (2) unjustifiably authorizes third party occupa-
tion of privately owned property that is not open to the public; (3) unjustifi-
ably singles out individuals among similarly situated persons to bear a wholly 
disproportionate weight of a non-enforcement decision instead of legitimately 
adjusting property allocations wholesale; or (4) retroactively and unjustifiably 
diverges from what a reasonable owner could have possibly expected when 
she invested in property and put that property to a legitimate and continuing 
non-harmful use in reliance on existing law. 
Failing to acknowledge property’s allocative nature and the inherent un-
constructiveness of distinguishing between action and inaction in the property 
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sphere runs the risk of concealing the full impact of collective choices at the 
expense of the principles of fairness and justice upon which takings law rests. 
Recognizing non-enforcement takings claims on the terms outlined here pre-
sents the Takings Clause not as a regularly-available tool to limit democratic 
decisions that serve to define and allocate property interests in the face of 
changing conditions, or, alternatively, as categorically inapplicable to a cer-
tain class of such decisions. Instead, it conceives of the Takings Clause as a 
tool that might be drawn upon in narrow circumstances to enhance such dem-
ocratic decision making by assuring that non-enforcement decisions, like de-
cisions to enact and enforce new regulations, are made with the fairness and 
justice of the responsibilities those decisions impose in mind. 
  
 
